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A TENDENCY TO DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT: 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
OBSCENITY LAW FROM HICKLIN TO ULYSSES II 
STEPHEN GILLERS∗ 
 There will be, doubtless, the usual outcry from circles self-styled 
artistic and literary over the fining of the two women who edit and 
publish The Little Review for printing in it a presentation of life in 
Dublin as seen by a writer by the name of Joyce—a work to which, 
for reasons few except himself are likely to guess, he gave the title 
of ‘Ulysses.’1  
 There are still those people who are not outraged by the mention 
of natural facts who will ask ‘what is the necessity to discuss them?’ 
But that is not a question to ask about a work of Art. The only 
question relevant at all to Ulysses is—Is it a work of Art?2 
 
 
 ∗ Emily Kempin Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I am very grateful to 
Anil Shankar, New York University School of Law J.D. 2008, whose intellectual relationship with 
Joyce and Ulysses made him the perfect research assistant for this Article. I am greatly indebted to 
Elizabeth M. Evans of the NYU School of Law Library for much help finding original source 
materials and getting needed consents to quote. I thank the New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox, 
and Tilden Foundations, Manuscripts and Archives Division, for permission to quote from John 
Quinn’s letters to Ezra Pound, Margaret Anderson, and Shane Leslie. I last thank the 
D’Agostino/Greenberg Fund for the assistance that allowed me the time to work on the article. An 
excerpt from this study appeared in different form in The Nation, Feb. 19, 2007, at 20. © 2007 Stephen 
Gillers. All rights reserved. 
 1. Topics of the Times: Taste, Not Morals, Violated, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1921, at 12 
(following the obscenity convictions of Margaret Anderson and Jane Heap for publishing an excerpt of 
Joyce’s work in progress). 
 2. jh, Art and the Law, LITTLE REVIEW 7 (Sept.–Dec. 1920). The author was Jane Heap. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, the store at 27 West Eighth Street in New York’s Greenwich 
Village sells shoes. No sign commemorates the role of an earlier tenant, a 
bookstore, in the battle to publish James Joyce’s Ulysses in the United 
States. Two blocks away, a plaque on the Jefferson Market Library recalls 
that from 1876 to 1932 the building was called the Jefferson Market 
Courthouse and housed the “women’s court.” Unmentioned is that 
Margaret Anderson and Jane Heap were prosecuted in the building for 
obscenity after publishing an excerpt from (the yet unfinished) Ulysses in 
The Little Review, their low circulation literary magazine.3 A likeness of 
Margaret Anderson appears in a mural on the uptown platform of the 
Christopher Street subway station a few blocks south of the library, 
alongside those of Marcel Duchamp, Eugene O’Neill, Edna St. Vincent 
Millay, and others who made Greenwich Village the Bohemian capital of 
 
 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 175–76.  
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the United States in the 1920s. The mural describes Anderson as 
“publisher”; it does not mention The Little Review.  
Ulysses is among the best English language novels of the twentieth 
century,4 but the prosecution of Anderson and Heap prevented the book’s 
publication in the United States for a dozen years after Joyce completed it 
in 1921. Personal and financial risks were seen as too high. Like Anderson 
and Heap, anyone in New York who published or sold the book risked a 
$1,000 fine and a year in jail.5 The post office would likely exclude the 
book from the mail and destroy copies placed there, making publication 
financially rash.6 Benjamin W. Huebsch, the American publisher of 
Joyce’s Dubliners and A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, passed on 
Ulysses.7 Until the young Bennett Cerf appeared in 1932 with his new 
company Random House, no one would chance publication8 despite 
Joyce’s growing reputation,9 or the fact that on February 2, 1922, Joyce’s 
fortieth birthday, Sylvia Beach published Ulysses in France (in English) 
through her bookstore, Shakespeare and Company, without incident and 
with good sales, amounting to eleven editions in the ensuing decade.10 
Within weeks, smuggled copies of the French edition were selling for $50 
 
 
 4. The board of the Modern Library voted Ulysses the best English language novel of the 
twentieth century. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, also by Joyce, was third. The Modern 
Library is owned by Random House, which publishes Ulysses. The listing can be found at: 
http://www.randomhouse.com/modernlibrary/100bestnovels.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). Other 
publications concur. See, e.g., Michelle Pauli, Joyce Tops Poll of Most Valuable Books, GUARDIAN 
UNLIMITED, Jan. 19, 2006, http://books.guardian.co.uk/news/articles/0..1690275.00.html. 
 5. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1141 (1909) (becoming N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.05 (McKinney 1982)). 
 6. Exclusion from the mails was the fate of three issues of The Little Review containing excerpts 
from Ulysses. PAUL VANDERHAM, JAMES JOYCE AND CENSORSHIP 28–34 (1998); Jackson Bryer, 
Joyce, Ulysses, and The Little Review, S. ATLANTIC Q. 148, 153–55 (1967). 
 7. RICHARD ELLMANN, JAMES JOYCE 406, 504 (1982); B.L. REID, THE MAN FROM NEW YORK: 
JOHN QUINN AND HIS FRIENDS 484–85 (1968). See also HERBERT GORMAN, JAMES JOYCE 279–80 
(1948) (reprinting letters from Benjamin Huebsch to John Quinn, dated March 24, 1921, and April 5, 
1921). 
 8. Samuel Roth published unauthorized (and corrupted) excerpts of Ulysses in his magazine 
Two Worlds Monthly from 1925 to 1927. Joyce sued, enjoining Roth from further publication in 1928, 
by which time he had stopped. ELLMANN, supra note 7, at 587. 
 9. See, e.g., H.W. Boynton, Outstanding Novels of the Season, NATION, Apr. 5, 1917, at 403; 
H.G. Wells, James Joyce, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1917, at 159. 
 10. For a discussion of the publishing history of Ulysses by Sylvia Beach, see generally NOEL 
RILEY FITCH, SYLVIA BEACH AND THE LOST GENERATION: A HISTORY OF LITERARY PARIS IN THE 
TWENTIES AND THIRTIES (1983). In her 1956 autobiography, Beach recounts how she came to publish 
the book. After the conviction of the editors of The Little Review in New York, Joyce told Beach: “My 
book will never come out now.” Beach replied: “Would you let Shakespeare and Company have the 
honor of bringing out your Ulysses?” SYLVIA BEACH, SHAKESPEARE AND COMPANY 47 (1959). Beach 
was on the verge of publishing the twelfth edition of Ulysses when Joyce contracted with Random 
House. FITCH, supra, at 329. 
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in New York (equivalent to more than $500 today).11 Even so, in the 
summer of 1922, John Quinn, a prominent and politically connected New 
York lawyer, told Harriet Shaw Weaver, Joyce’s British benefactor: 
“Ulysses, unexpurgated, unchanged, cannot be published in the United 
States without the certainty of prosecution and conviction.”12 Quinn was a 
collector of art, a patron of writers and artists, and a friend of Joyce, Yeats, 
and Ezra Pound.13 He figures prominently in this story because, in 1920 
and 1921, he mounted the first American court defense of Ulysses when he 
represented Anderson and Heap in their obscenity trial.14 Quinn did not 
want the case. He believed that the legal test of Ulysses should await its 
completion, when the book, judged as a whole, would in his view have a 
better chance of escaping the censor.15 Today, Quinn’s defense of 
Anderson and Heap is his most famous case. It entitles him to a footnote in 
the literary history of the United States. Maybe Quinn was right about the 
certainty of conviction for publishing Ulysses following the Anderson and 
Heap trial; or, as I will argue, maybe not.16 If Quinn was right, however, 
he is partly to blame for failing to do all he could to win, perhaps because 
he was certain that any effort was doomed to fail.17 
But Quinn is only partly to blame. The courts are also at fault. In 1921, 
the law, though changing, remained largely and thoughtlessly hostile to 
anything in print (or other medium) if “the matter” had a “tendency . . . to 
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral 
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.”18 
This is the test for obscenity that Chief Justice Cockburn set down in R v. 
Hicklin, an 1868 decision of the Queen’s Bench in England.19 Hicklin had 
substantial influence on American obscenity law in the last third of the 
 
 
 11. REID, supra note 7, at 532. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Quinn’s friendships with artists and writers and his involvement with the arts generally are 
detailed in nearly every chapter of REID, supra note 7. 
 14. The Ulysses excerpt that prompted the prosecution of Anderson and Heap describes a sexual 
(though not a physical) encounter between Leopold Bloom and Gerty MacDowell on a Dublin beach. 
See infra text accompanying notes 178–80. 
 15. Quinn might have changed his mind after seeing “Penelope,” the yet unwritten final chapter, 
containing Molly Bloom’s erotic soliloquy. Quinn thought Ulysses would have the best chance in a 
privately printed expensive edition. Letter from John Quinn to Margaret C. Anderson at 12–13 (Feb. 5, 
1921) (original in collection of S. Ill. U., Carbondale). The circumstances leading to Quinn’s defense 
of an excerpt of Ulysses published in The Little Review are told in BRYER, supra note 6; REID, supra 
note 7 at 441–42; VANDERHAM, supra note 6, at 37–56.  
 16. See infra Part IV.D. 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 251–52. 
 18. R v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360, 371. 
 19. Id.  
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nineteenth and first third of the twentieth centuries and thereafter. That law 
was muddled, to say the least. American rulings are inconsistent. A court 
might offer Hicklin as the main, or only, justification it needed to suppress 
a work. Another court might struggle to escape the Hicklin straitjacket. 
Who, after all, would want to be remembered as the judge who suppressed 
Voltaire, Ovid, Fielding, or Rabelais, each of whose works had been the 
subject of New York litigation?20 Results were idiosyncratic as well 
because Hicklin left censorship decisions to the imagination of the triers of 
fact in each case (judge or jury), who were expected, without the benefit of 
expert testimony, to predict how those most susceptible to “immoral 
influences” (not themselves) might respond to the alleged obscenity.21 
The Hicklin-inspired regime is all the more remarkable because 
nothing in Cockburn’s brief test for obscenity can pass for legal reasoning, 
or any other kind of reasoning. Its single sentence seems tossed off.22 It 
offers no authority, no analysis, no awareness of the breadth of its 
declamation. No matter. Several American courts, searching for precedent 
for their own obscenity cases, subscribed to Hicklin with little or no 
evaluation of alternatives, the practical implications, the unusual factual 
context of the Hicklin decision, or the free speech provisions of the 
national and state constitutions. Other courts then cited those courts. In 
this way, Hicklin infiltrated American case law even when Hicklin itself 
went uncited. For ninety-nine years, although with declining influence, 
Hicklin served as a kind of legal lasso judges could use to restrain 
expression in literature and the arts. Even as late as 1951, a federal judge 
in San Francisco cited the Hicklin test to declare Henry Miller’s Tropic of 
Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn obscene.23 
The New York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, first quoted 
Cockburn in an 1884 case, People v. Muller, which convicted a clerk for 
selling nine photographs of French paintings portraying naked women.24 
Although Hicklin would not again appear in a majority opinion of the 
court until 1953,25 Muller’s approval of the Hicklin test made it binding on 
New York courts and influential beyond. As of 1920, when Quinn was 
called to defend a portion of one chapter of Ulysses before a criminal court 
in Manhattan, the Court of Appeals had not abandoned Hicklin or Muller. 
 
 
 20. See infra text accompanying note 252. 
 21. Hicklin, 3 Q.B. at 371. 
 22. Id.  
 23. United States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1951).  
 24. People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408 (1884). 
 25. See infra note 117.  
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But a few lower courts had implied discontent with their potential 
breadth.26 Careful observers of the time might have predicted an imminent, 
if gradual, shift toward greater freedom for writers and artists. In 
retrospect, we know that this prediction would have been correct. The 
decade of the 1920s marked a turning point in this area of law. Could 
Quinn’s case, one of the last big victories for the forces of Hicklin-inspired 
suppression, instead have been a significant victory in the movement away 
from Hicklin? I believe so.27  
Hicklin was permanently interred nationwide in 1957 when the United 
States Supreme Court decided Roth v. United States, which by giving 
“obscenity” a constitutional definition allowed significant federal 
protection against censorship of writers and artists.28 But Hicklin caused 
much mischief until then. Not only Ulysses, but publication of other 
books—by Theodore Dreiser, D.H. Lawrence, and Henry Miller, among 
others—was delayed or denied under Hicklin’s dubious authority. Plays 
were not produced. Art was suppressed.29 We will never know what was 
not written, painted, photographed, or performed—or was altered—to 
avoid Hicklin’s reach. This point bears emphasis. When scholars evaluate 
the consequences of a court decision, they are understandably inclined to 
consider its influence on other decisions. They look to what is there, not 
what is absent. Yet Hicklin and the prosecutions it spawned would have 
led artists, authors, producers, and publishers to refrain from activity 
because of the personal and financial risks, which is of course what 
happened in the dozen years between Sylvia Beach’s publication of 
Ulysses in 1922 and the Random House edition. 
 
 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 233–50. 
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 273–78. 
 28. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) (“The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the 
effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well encompass material 
legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the 
freedoms of speech and press.”). Roth collects lower court cases rejecting the Hicklin standard. Id. at 
489 n.26. 
 29. United States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1951) (Tropic of Cancer 
and Tropic of Capricorn by Henry Miller); People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408 (1884) (photographs of 
paintings); People v. Pesky, 243 N.Y.S. 193 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930), aff’d, 254 N.Y. 373 (1930) (a 
book containing a play); EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE: THE LAW OF 
OBSCENITY AND THE ASSAULT ON GENIUS 91, 135–39 (1993) (Lawrence and Dreiser). In Liveright v. 
Waldorf Theaters Corp., 221 N.Y.S. 194 (N.Y. App. Div. 1927), a theater owner refused to allow 
Liveright to mount a play, despite his lease of the theater, because production of the same play had 
earlier resulted in the arrest of the actors and producers. Liveright sought an injunction to require the 
defendant to permit the play. Liveright, 221 N.Y.S. at 195. The court refused on the ground that the 
request was not “in the realm of equitable jurisdiction.” Id. at 196. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/1
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No judicial pronouncement from an American or British court in the 
last 140 years has been as harmful to creative artists as Cockburn’s single 
sentence. Yet Hicklin’s facts are unusual, as we shall see. For one thing, 
the publication before the Hicklin court was a piece of advocacy, a 
polemic, not art or fiction.30 Hicklin was also unusual because the manner 
in which the offending publication was distributed made it easily available 
to children. It would have been simple for a later court to acknowledge 
Hicklin’s definition of obscenity as perhaps correct for its peculiar facts 
and then to ignore it when evaluating a book, play, or painting aimed at 
adult audiences. The failure of American courts to address these subtleties, 
while also unreflectively adopting an obscenity standard that could easily 
ban Shakespeare, Chaucer, Ovid, and the Bible, is breathtaking. It took the 
second Ulysses case (“Ulysses II”) finally to inflict serious (but by no 
means fatal) harm on Hicklin’s place in American jurisprudence. Hicklin 
(or its test) won the first confrontation with Joyce’s work, but it lost the 
second.31 Weakened, it nevertheless remained part of American 
jurisprudence for another twenty-five years.  
II. TWO STORIES: ONE DOCTRINAL, ONE PRACTICAL 
We have two stories, doctrinal and practical, both fascinating and 
instructive. The doctrinal story first. It begins with Hicklin, traces its 
influence, and examines how courts came to shed that influence. In this 
story, the law is initially timid, even when it liberates the matter alleged to 
be obscene. Then came the second Ulysses litigation and a Second Circuit 
opinion rejecting Hicklin by name. In the ensuing five decades, judges 
made it increasingly difficult for the state to suppress a creative work. By 
the 1980s, obscenity prosecutions were rare, especially in urban areas and 
on the coasts. Today, cable television and the Internet have almost entirely 
eroded the ability to effectively suppress whatever remains 
constitutionally unprotected. Fortune 500 companies have entered the 
market and profit from the sale of what was once (and may still be) called 
“hard-core pornography”—that is, what Justice Potter Stewart had in mind 
 
 
 30. See infra text accompanying notes 48–51. 
 31. The prosecution of Margaret Anderson and Jane Heap for publishing an excerpt from one 
chapter of Ulysses in The Little Review was the first encounter between Joyce and the Hicklin standard, 
discussed at infra text accompanying notes 171–217. The second encounter was, of course, Random 
House’s effort to establish that Ulysses itself, now in book form, could be admitted into the United 
States. United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff’d, sub nom. 
United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce (Random House, Inc.), 72 F.2d 705 (2d 
Cir. 1934).  
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when he said, “I know it when I see it.”32 True, the government retains 
power over the airways because it can revoke licenses and impose fines. 
But that power is deployed to restrict broadcast of much that is not 
obscene, material that in other media has been constitutionally protected 
for decades.33 Obscenity battles today are fought mainly at the margins: 
First, to protect children from being used as subjects in sexually explicit 
videos and photographs, an essential goal better seen as ending child 
abuse.34 Second, to keep sexually explicit material away from those under 
eighteen,35 also a worthy goal, especially for younger children, but one 
that the Internet and cable television make difficult even for the most 
determined parents. Third, to insure that sexually explicit materials are not 
thrust upon those who do not wish to view them.36  
Despite changes in obscenity doctrine and enforcement, studying the 
influence of Hicklin and the events leading up to Ulysses II remains 
important. It tells us how change happens in the law, including 
constitutional law. At times, however, that change, though gratifying, is 
not much more doctrinally coherent than the precedent it limits or 
overturns.37 Candor about sex in art, fiction and non-fiction, and later film, 
went from enjoying almost no legal protections in 1900 to virtually no 
restrictions in 2000. Books, movies, and photography exhibits that cause 
little or no stir today would have flabbergasted the groups committed to 
suppressing vice a century ago.38 We need to understand how and why 
 
 
 32. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). That Fortune 500 
companies now have equity interests in what would conventionally be understood as pornography has 
been much reported. For example, Frontline produced a report on Public Television entitled 
“American Porn,” which Frontline described as “a multibillion-dollar business.” See Frontline, 
American Porn, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/porn/. 
 33. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding the power of the Federal 
Communications Commission to fine a radio station for using “7 dirty words”). 
 34. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251A (2000). 
 35. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.21, 235.22 (2007). 
 36. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18–19 (1973) (“This Court has recognized that the States 
have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the 
mode of dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling 
recipients or of exposure to juveniles.”) (footnote omitted). 
 37. The 1933 district court opinion upholding Random House’s effort to import a copy of 
Ulysses from France, for example, has won extravagant praise for decades, but it is an abysmal 
example of judicial reasoning, very nearly a caricature of what we think of as law. See infra text 
accompanying notes 341–67. 
 38. In 1990, an Ohio jury acquitted the executive director of the Cincinnati Art Museum, who 
was prosecuted for displaying Robert Mapplethorpe’s sexually provocative photographs. Isabel 
Wilkerson, Cincinnati Jury Acquits Museum in Mapplethorpe Obscenity Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 
1990, at 1. The museum’s director, Dennis Barrie, was also acquitted. Five of the 175 photographs in 
the exhibition “depicted men in sadomasochistic poses and were the basis of charges that the museum 
and Mr. Barrie had pandered obscenity.” Id. at 6. 
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these changes occurred. Reviewing this history is important, too, because 
it ought to make us humble about our certainties. Hicklin and its followers 
in American jurisprudence aimed to control thought. They said so 
explicitly.39 The dominant targets of the opinions were ideas and images, 
which courts ruled could not be disseminated because they could inspire 
morally unworthy thoughts in some viewers or readers. Courts saw no 
need to find even a remote connection between bad thoughts and bad 
conduct. Bad thoughts alone justified suppression.40  
Today, of course, we do not need a study to remind us that ideas should 
not be suppressed even if deemed morally offensive. We do not currently 
face legal contraction of First Amendment rights for the arts, at least not 
by the courts. If local legislatures occasionally go overboard, they will be 
corrected.41 But that does not mean the Hicklin to Ulysses study is merely 
an interesting chapter in legal history, although it is certainly that. The 
study has current value. The suppression of Ulysses, which seems 
preposterous today, should caution us against temptation to use the law or 
the purse to control the lives or thoughts of others who are harming no 
one.  
The practical story, incident to the doctrinal one, focuses on the 
Ulysses litigations. Two lawyers in the same city, working a dozen years 
apart with somewhat different precedent and case records, before different 
courts, sought to avoid Hicklin and other decisions to achieve their clients’ 
goals. The first lawyer, John Quinn, expected to fail and did;42 the second 
lawyer, Morris Ernst, ardently believed the law should protect his client’s 
right to publish and won.43 Ernst’s 1933 success in freeing the finished 
book does not mean that a more confident Quinn would have won at trial 
in 1921 by using Ernst’s arguments. For although Quinn had to defend 
only a portion of one chapter of the book, the climate then was less 
 
 
 39. See, e.g., infra note 40 and text accompanying note 109.  
 40. In a pre-trial decision refusing to hold that The Well of Loneliness was not obscene as a 
matter of law, the court ruled that the book was “calculated to deprave and corrupt minds open to its 
immoral influences.” People v. Friede, 233 N.Y.S. 565, 570 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1929). The predicted 
corruption of at least some minds was the evil that the state could prevent without regard to the 
conduct that might or might not ensue from the corruption. How exactly reading this book, whose 
subject was lesbianism, would actually corrupt or “influenc[e]” a reader, is left unsaid. At trial, all 
three judges acquitted the publisher. See PAUL S. BOYER, PURITY IN PRINT 133–34 (2d ed. 2002). 
 41. Executive Arts Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 391 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2004) (enjoining 
ordinance limiting operation of adult bookstore). I acknowledge as a special case exception National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998) (requiring that the NEA consider general 
standards of “decency and respect” for diverse beliefs and values of the American public in making 
grants is not facially invalid under First Amendment). 
 42. See infra Part IV.C. 
 43. See infra Parts IV.E and IV.F. 
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hospitable to sex in print. I will suggest, however, that Quinn might have 
won on appeal with the arguments Ernst made and if Quinn had been 
willing, as Ernst was, to reach beyond the court for support from the 
influential public.44 Quinn did not appeal because he thought loss was 
inevitable. The case law was more favorable to Ernst than to Quinn and 
Ernst benefited from the fact that Joyce’s reputation was firmly 
established by 1933. But Ernst had a burden Quinn did not have. The 
entire book, especially the final chapter, is far more sexually explicit than 
the pages Quinn had to defend.45  
Others have told a third story about American obscenity prosecutions 
in the half century leading up to the Second Circuit’s 1934 opinion in 
Ulysses (and thereafter). That story, equally important, asks why those 
who wished to censor books and plays were so successful—before 
legislative bodies and among the public—even when their claims defied 
common sense. Studies have offered many explanations. One cites the 
sheer determination of Anthony Comstock, the first secretary of the New 
York Society for the Suppression of Vice, founded in 1873,46 and of 
individuals who supplied money and energy to anti-vice groups, a 
determination that others were unwilling to challenge even if they 
disagreed. Another explanation identifies the wish of elite groups to keep 
candor about such things from the lower classes, a threat otherwise present 
as literacy increased and books became cheaper. A third view is that 
support for the anti-vice efforts was part of a larger movement to improve 
the lives of the lower classes by freeing them from “filth” of all kinds, not 
only disease and unhealthy living conditions. Others have seen the anti-
vice movement as a way to keep women ignorant about birth control, 
abortion, and even sex. And yet others have argued that the upper class 
joined this effort in order to protect their own children from a temptation 
that might cause them to lose their expected place in society.47  
I do not join this third debate. My interest is how the courts responded 
to censorship charges once they were leveled, or more particularly, how 
and why they failed to respond in a mindful way. That is, why did they fail 
to bring anything that can be recognized as the rule of law to the issues 
 
 
 44. See infra text accompanying notes 253–58. 
 45. The final chapter is the “Penelope” episode in which Molly Bloom, half awake, recalls events 
in her life, both before and after her marriage to Leopold Bloom. Her reverie is in several places 
particularly explicit. JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 738–83 (Vintage ed. 1990). 
 46. DE GRAZIA, supra note 29, at 4. 
 47. The literature containing these explanations is identified in Donna I. Dennis, Obscenity Law 
and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 369 
(2002) (book review). 
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raised in the contests before them? Where did American courts find the 
law? What weight did they give to the right to speak and publish? What 
conditions, in addition to the skills of Morris Ernst, contributed to the 
federal rulings that freed Ulysses, rulings that began (but only began) a 
decades-long retreat from the Hicklin straitjacket and toward greater 
artistic and literary freedom? 
To understand the Ulysses cases it is necessary to appreciate their 
antecedents, especially the Hicklin decision in England and three 
subsequent obscenity prosecutions (two state and one federal) in 
nineteenth-century New York. These four cases are discussed next. The 
Article then moves to its two main acts: the prosecution of Anderson and 
Heap and the federal court decisions that allowed Random House safely to 
publish Ulysses in the United States. The second of these federal 
decisions, from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, may be seen as the 
progenitor of modern obscenity law. Less prominent cases in the story are 
examined throughout. 
III. ANTECEDENTS OF THE ULYSSES CASES: HICKLIN, BENNETT, MULLER, 
AND KNOEDLER 
The lawyers who had to defend Ulysses (or a part of it) against 
obscenity charges in the third and fourth decades of the last century faced 
at least three hostile appellate cases that would have to be overruled or 
distinguished for any chance of success. Appreciating the legal strategies 
and results in the Ulysses cases requires attention to these and other 
decisions prior to 1920, when Anderson and Heap were charged. 
A. R v. Hicklin 
[T]he most filthy and disgusting and unnatural description it is 
possible to imagine.48 
R v. Hicklin49 has its genesis in religious animosity—Protestant against 
Catholic—but it was not a case about blasphemy or religious difference. 
Nor was it, strictly speaking, a criminal prosecution, although a statutory 
peculiarity gave it a criminal law dimension. The case most resembles an 
 
 
 48. R v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360, 371. 
 49. The full title of the case in the law reports is “The Queen, on the Prosecution of Henry Scott, 
Appellant, v. Benjamin Hicklin and Another, Justices of Wolverhampton, Respondents.” Id. at 360. 
The explanation for this title will become apparent in the text. 
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action for forfeiture. The objects of the forfeiture were copies of a 
pamphlet entitled “The Confessional Unmasked” and provocatively 
subtitled “shewing the depravity of the Romish priesthood, the iniquity of 
the Confessional, and the questions put to females in confession.”50 I quote 
from the official report for the sequence of events leading up to the action: 
 The appellant [Scott] is a metal broker, residing in the town of 
Wolverhampton, and a person of respectable position and character. 
He is a member of a body styled “The Protestant Electoral Union,” 
whose objects are, inter alia, “to protest against those teachings and 
practices which are un-English, immoral, and blasphemous, to 
maintain the Protestantism of the Bible and the liberty of England,” 
and “to promote the return to Parliament of men who will assist 
them in these objects, and particularly will expose and defeat the 
deep-laid machinations of the Jesuits, and resist grants of money for 
Romish purposes.” In order to promote the objects and principles of 
this society, the appellant purchased from time to time, at the central 
office of the society in London, copies of a pamphlet, entitled “The 
Confessional Unmasked” . . . of which pamphlets he sold between 
two and three thousand copies at the price he gave for them, viz., 1s. 
each, to any person who applied for them.  
 A complaint was thereupon made before two justices of the 
borough [respondents], by a police officer acting under the direction 
of the Watch Committee of the borough, and the justices issued 
their warrant under the above statute, by virtue of which warrant 
252 of the pamphlets were seized on the premises of the appellant, 
and ordered by the justices to be destroyed. 
 The pamphlet consists of extracts taken from the works of 
certain theologians who have written at various times on the 
doctrines and discipline of the Church of Rome, and particularly on 
the practice of auricular confession. On one side of the page are 
printed passages in the original Latin, correctly extracted from the 
works of those writers, and opposite to each extract is placed a free 
translation of such extract into English. The pamphlet also contains 
a preface and notes and comments, condemnatory of the tracts and 
principles laid down by the authors from whose works the extracts 
are taken. About one half of the pamphlet relates to casuistical and 
controversial questions which are not obscene, but the remainder of 
 
 
 50. Id. at 362. 
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the pamphlet is obscene in fact as relating to impure and filthy acts, 
words, and ideas. The appellant did not keep or sell the pamphlets 
for purposes of gain, nor to prejudice good morals, though the 
indiscriminate sale and circulation of them is calculated to have that 
effect; but he kept and sold the pamphlets, as a member of the 
Protestant Electoral Union, to promote the objects of that society, 
and to expose what he deems to be errors of the Church of Rome, 
and particularly the immorality of the Confessional.51  
The recorder overruled the local justices. He agreed that the pamphlets 
were obscene,52 which Scott’s counsel had in any event conceded, but 
concluded that they could not be destroyed “under these circumstances,” a 
reference to Scott’s purposes, which Chief Justice Cockburn later 
characterized for the Queen’s Bench as “not to do harm, but good.”53 
Scott’s counsel argued that the absence of “criminal intention” deprived 
the court of jurisdiction to order destruction of the pamphlets.54 A modern 
lawyer would reply that the owner’s intent is irrelevant because a 
forfeiture action proceeds against the thing itself.55 It is not a prosecution 
of the owner; however, the governing statute in Hicklin had a peculiarity, 
whose purpose would appear to be to protect speech. The statute permitted 
seizure and destruction of an article only if its “publication . . . would be a 
misdemeanor and proper to be prosecuted as such.”56 (The conjunctive 
“and” can be seen as a further limitation.) The Queen’s Bench therefore 
 
 
 51. Id. at 362–63. 
 52. Chief Justice Cockburn states that the recorder did not reverse the magistrates on the ground 
that the pamphlet was not obscene.  
[H]e leaves that ground untouched, but he reversed the magistrates’ decision upon the ground 
that, although this work was an obscene publication, and although its tendency upon the 
public mind was that suggested upon the part of the information, yet that the immediate 
intention of the appellant was not so to affect the public mind, but to expose the practices and 
errors of the confessional system in the Roman Catholic Church. 
Id. at 370. 
 53. Id. at 363–64. 
 54. Id. at 363. 
 55. See, e.g., Riley v. 1987 Station Wagon, 650 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. 2002) (“In Minnesota, 
an action for forfeiture is a civil in rem action. The property seized becomes the defendant based on 
the legal fiction that it is the inanimate object itself, not its possessor or owner, that is guilty of 
wrongdoing.”) (citations omitted). 
 56. Hicklin, 3 Q.B. at 361 n.1. The statute required the magistrate to find that the “articles . . . are 
of such a character and description that the publication of them would be a misdemeanor, and proper 
to be prosecuted as such.” Id. The magistrate also had to find that the obscene material was kept “for 
the purposes of sale or distribution, exhibition for the purposes of gain, lending upon hire, or being 
otherwise published for purposes of gain.” Id. The word “gain” is used only with regard to certain of 
the forbidden conduct, not all of it, a point stressed by counsel for the Queen, who argued that the 
“word ‘gain’ does not occur in the clause, ‘for the purpose of sale or distribution.’” Id. at 368. 
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had to decide whether distribution of the pamphlet could be punished as a 
crime. “Here,” Scott’s counsel argued, “the publication of this pamphlet, 
though obscene, was with an honest intention of exposing the Roman 
Confessional . . . .”57  
Queen’s counsel sought to distinguish between intention and motive.58 
In so far as intent is relevant, he argued, “it must be inferred that [Scott] 
intended the natural consequences of his act” and those were to “prejudice 
good morals.”59 Cockburn accepted this argument. Motive was irrelevant. 
Since Scott had conceded that the pamphlet was obscene, the court could 
infer intent.60 Scott did not claim ignorance of its content. Because he 
distributed the pamphlet, aware of its content, and because the pamphlet 
was obscene, Scott was guilty. 
Cockburn dismissed Scott’s claim “that there are a great many 
publications of high repute in the literary productions of this country the 
tendency of which is immodest, and, if you please, immoral, and possibly 
there might have been subject-matter for indictment in many of the works 
which have been referred to.”61 (Counsel had cited Chaucer, Dryden, 
Shelley and Byron.)62 The court was unmoved. It was concerned only with 
the pamphlet before it. Cockburn then stated what he called the “test of 
obscenity” in language that would become famous in English and 
American jurisprudence, though often cited without regard to the facts 
before the Hicklin court: 
I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the 
matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose 
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a 
publication of this sort may fall.63  
Cockburn elaborated. It was “quite certain,” he said, “that [the 
pamphlet] would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even 
to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of a most impure and 
libidinous character.”64 He emphasized that the pamphlet “is sold at the 
corner of streets, and in all directions, and of course it falls into the hands 
of persons of all classes, young and old, and the minds of those hitherto 
 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 370. 
 61. Id. at 371. 
 62. Id. at 365, 374, 365. 
 63. Id. at 371. 
 64. Id. 
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pure are exposed to the danger of contamination and pollution from the 
impurity it contains.”65 For Cockburn and the other judges, it was 
important that Scott made no effort to control the pamphlet’s distribution. 
Cockburn underscored this importance when he compared the audience for 
Scott’s pamphlet to the one for medical books:  
A medical treatise, with illustrations necessary for the information 
of those for whose education or information the work is intended, 
may, in a certain sense, be obscene, and yet not the subject for 
indictment; but it can never be that these prints may be exhibited for 
any one, boys and girls, to see as they pass. The immunity must 
depend upon the circumstances of the publication.66  
Obscenity, then, does not depend on context. Even a medical treatise 
may be obscene “in a certain sense.” However, obscenity alone will not 
justify seizure or prosecution. Whether a medical treatise may be seized as 
obscene depends on the circumstances of its distribution. Later courts, in 
lifting Cockburn’s definition of obscenity out of the opinion, ignored the 
emphasis on Scott’s manner of distribution. 
Cockburn recognized that Scott wished to encourage discussion on a 
subject of public interest, at least as Scott saw it. Implicitly, at least, 
Cockburn understood that an adverse ruling would interfere with Scott’s 
“honest” objective. That realization appears to have given Cockburn some 
pause. (Justice Mellor was explicit on this point, as discussed below.) 
Cockburn overcame his concern by weighing Scott’s means for achieving 
his objective against the harm his pamphlet would cause. The balance 
favored suppression because “the probability is, that nine hundred and 
ninety-nine out of every thousand into whose hand this work would fall 
would never be exposed to the chance of being converted to the Roman 
Catholic religion.”67 Because Scott’s method was highly inefficient, in 
other words, he could not justify distribution of the pamphlet in the 
manner he chose. For Cockburn this was no close case. He called some of 
the passages in the pamphlet “the most filthy and disgusting and unnatural 
description[s] it is possible to imagine.”68 One example is set out in the 
margin.69 
 
 
 65. Id. at 372. 
 66. Id. at 367. 
 67. Id. at 372. 
 68. Id. at 371. 
 69. The following excerpt is said to come from the writing of Alphonso De Liguori, who the 
pamphlet says “was canonized at Rome on the 26th of May, 1839.” The purpose in setting out this 
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Concurring, Justice Blackburn emphasized the “indiscriminate” nature 
of the distribution70 and mentioned “schoolboys”71 as among the potential 
recipients. He then drew telling analogies. He first cited a case where a 
man was charged with selling “unwholesome” bread to “a military 
asylum” where it would be fed to children.72 Although it was not alleged 
that “[the man] intended to make the children suffer,” it was held “quite 
sufficient that he had done an unlawful act in giving them bread which 
was deleterious.”73 He then cited a case “in which a person carried a child 
which was suffering from a contagious disease, along the public road to 
the danger of the health of all those who happened to be in that road.” That 
conduct could be prosecuted as a misdemeanor even though it was not 
“alleged that defendant intended that anybody should catch the disease.”74 
The comparison of obscene matter to tainted food and a contagious disease 
helps explain why England viewed obscene material as dangerous in the 
first place. Disease and tainted food injure the body. They must be 
stopped. Obscenity “deprave[s] and corrupt[s]” the mind, which is also an 
“evil” (Cockburn uses this word).75 That must be stopped. In short, 
reading the “filthy” passages in “The Confessional Unmasked” would 
deprave and corrupt the minds of some individuals into whose hands it 
may fall, especially given Scott’s mode of dissemination.  
 
 
English translation of the works of Liguori (and others) was to reveal the content of what occurs in the 
confessional. 
It is asked, 1st, does a man sin mortally by commencing the act of copulation in the hinder 
vessel, that he may afterwards finish it in the proper vessel? This is denied by Navarr. &c., 
provided there be no danger of pollution; because, otherwise, as they say, all touches, even 
venereal, are not grievously illicit among married persons. But it is commonly and more truly 
affirmed by Sanchez, &c. The reason is, because the very act of copulation after this manner 
(even without spending) is real sodomy, although not consummated, just as copulation itself 
in the natural vessel of a strange woman is real fornication, though there may be no spending. 
But is it a mortal sin for a man to rub his ___ against the hinder vessel of the wife? This is 
denied by Sanchez, &c., because to touch the mouth of the hinder vessel is not ordained for 
sodomical copulation. But it is more truly affirmed by Pontius, &c., and also by Tambur. 
(who testifies that the opinion of Sanchez has been expunged from some books. Nay, Moyas 
asserts that Sanchez himself had retracted, in the Antwerp edition, anno 1614.) The reason is, 
that such touch cannot morally take place without affecting sodomy. 
ALPHONSO DE LIGUORI, THE CONFESSIONAL UNMASKED 58 (1867). 
 70. R v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360, 376. 
 71. Id. at 377. 
 72. Id. at 376. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. Cockburn also adopts this analogy, using the words “contamination and pollution from 
the impurity [the pamphlet] contains.” Id. at 372. 
 75. Id. at 372. 
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Finally, Justice Mellor had what he called “hesitation”76 even though, 
in the end, he agreed with the others. He believed that the subject of 
Scott’s argument was legitimate for public discussion and wrote that “it 
cannot be discussed without to a certain extent producing authorities for 
the assertion that the confessional would be a mischievous thing to be 
introduced into this kingdom.”77 But to what extent? For Mellor, that was 
the key issue. It was “very much a question of degree.”78 Scott went “far 
beyond anything which was necessary or legitimate for the purpose.”79 
The result might have differed if Scott’s text had been more subtle. It 
might then have satisfied Mellor’s explicit balancing of the interest in 
public debate against the content of the pamphlet. But not even a toned-
down text would likely have satisfied Cockburn’s implicit balancing test, 
which weighed the content of the pamphlet against the strong 
improbability that it could achieve Scott’s goal. 
Hicklin differs from most of the cases that later embraced Cockburn’s 
one sentence definition of obscenity. The pamphlet Scott sold advocated 
an idea; it was not a creative work. As Mellor recognized, that idea could 
scarcely be separated from the content of the questions allegedly put in 
“The Confessional” and which Scott wished to publicize. Of course, Scott 
could have described the content generally, but that would have much 
diminished the force of his argument, which depended on the explicit 
nature of the questions. The court was therefore in the position of using 
the designation “obscene” to limit public debate on an issue that Mellor, at 
least, considered a legitimate public concern. The court did not allow 
publication of the very language needed to focus the debate. Later courts 
that cited either Hicklin or its test for obscenity mostly addressed creative 
works. One exception is the prosecution of Deboigne Bennett for 
distributing “Cupid’s Yokes,” discussed below.80 
This difference leads in turn to a broader question: Should the degree 
of protection for a written work turn on whether it is fiction (or other 
creative work) or is instead an effort to address an idea or a matter of 
public policy? If so, which purpose should enjoy greater protection? 
Should courts weigh, as Cockburn did, the likelihood that an advocacy 
piece would successfully change minds? Should the courts weigh, as 
Mellor did, whether the interest in public debate could be satisfied with a 
 
 
 76. Id. at 378. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See infra text accompanying notes 83–115. 
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less explicit text? Some of these questions, largely ignored in the 
following decades, surfaced in the second Ulysses case, implicitly in the 
majority opinion and explicitly in the dissent, to the advantage of fiction, 
which emerged with the same legal protection as non-fiction.81  
Hicklin soon migrated to the United States, carrying in its luggage three 
important and influential legal principles. First, indiscriminate distribution 
of sexually explicit material, whose nature is known to the distributor, can 
support an obscenity prosecution regardless of the distributor’s good 
motives. Second, the fact that intent can be inferred from knowledge of the 
content creates something close to absolute liability. The defendant will 
not be heard to say that although he knew the content, he did not know it 
was obscene. Last, Cockburn’s broad language suggests he would likely 
have ruled the same even if Scott had limited distribution to adults. The 
American courts did not read the case as turning on the likelihood that the 
pamphlets would reach children. Nor did they treat a broader reading as 
gratuitous, though it was. Mostly, they just quoted a single sentence. 
B. United States v. Bennett 
The most obscene, lewd, and lascivious matter may be conveyed by 
words which in themselves are not of an obscene character. The 
question is as to the idea which is conveyed in the words that are 
used, and that idea characterizes the language.82  
As demonstrated by this and other incoherent pronouncements in 
United States v. Bennett,83 Hicklin’s several opinions, and the disparity 
between its unusual facts and its ambitious pronouncements, made it 
difficult to predict what courts would find unprintable. In 1879, Bennett, 
an obscenity prosecution, made matters worse. The excerpt quoted above 
was part of the trial court’s instruction to the jury.84 But earlier in the 
instructions the court also told the jurors that “[f]reelovers and freethinkers 
have a right to their views, and they may express them, and they may 
publish them.”85 One can scarcely imagine how a lay jury could reconcile 
the apparent contradiction even if it could discern the court’s meaning: 
While freethinkers have a “right” to express and publish “their views,” 
 
 
 81. See infra text accompanying notes 410–11. 
 82. United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1102 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571). 
 83. 24 F. Cas. 1093 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571). 
 84. Id. at 1100–02. 
 85. Id. at 1101. 
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they cannot publish obscene ideas, and ideas can be obscene even if no 
obscene language is used to express them. So, that must mean that 
freelovers and freethinkers may not express and publish at least some of 
their views on free love and free thought. Bennett is the first reported 
American obscenity case to cite Hicklin. It addressed a far tamer document 
than did Hicklin and, unlike Hicklin, was a true criminal prosecution, not a 
hypothetical one. But like Hicklin, and unlike later cases that rely on it, 
Bennett’s focus was a work of advocacy, not a creative work. Using the 
“obscenity” label to foreclose distribution of the work, therefore, impeded 
discussion of ideas, a purpose that the court purported to disclaim but 
inevitably endorsed. 
Bennett’s factual background is unusual. The prosecution seems to 
have had its genesis in a battle of wills between Anthony Comstock86 and 
two men whose social views made them his polar opposite. The defendant 
was Deboigne M. Bennett, but he was not the author of the offending 
publication. As Professor David Rabban tells the story, Ezra Heywood, 
born in 1829, published a twenty-three page pamphlet entitled “Cupid’s 
Yokes” in 1876.87 Heywood was an abolitionist, civil libertarian, labor 
reformer, peace activist, and advocate of the right of women to vote.88 In 
many ways he was ahead of his time and in some ways, perhaps, of 
present times, too. Apparently, Heywood was not shy in proclaiming his 
views on these issues. Rabban writes: 
[Cupid’s Yokes] linked free love to abolitionism and labor reform 
under an umbrella of anarchist commitments to individual 
autonomy and freedom from state control. Although Cupid’s Yokes 
included some sexually explicit references to birth control, it was 
essentially a polemical attack on marriage. Cupid’s Yokes contained 
 
 
 86. On Comstock generally, see HEYWOOD BROUN & MARGARET LEECH, ANTHONY 
COMSTOCK: ROUNDSMAN OF THE LORD (1927); MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN: 
“INDECENCY,” CENSORSHIP, AND THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH 29–36 (2001). Comstock believed that 
“[t]he three great crime-breeders of today are intemperance, gambling, and evil reading.” Mary Alden 
Hopkins, Birth Control and Public Morals: An Interview with Anthony Comstock, HARPERS WEEKLY, 
May 22, 1915. Regarding the last, he wrote in a letter celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the 
Society for the Suppression of Vice: “If you allow the devil to decorate the Chamber of Imagery in 
your heart with licentious and sensual things, you will find that he has practically thrown a noose 
about your neck and will forever after exert himself to draw you away from the ‘Lamb of God which 
taketh away sins of the world.’” Id. Once vile pictures “enter through the eye and ear into the chamber 
of imagery in the heart of the child, nothing but the grace of God can ever erase or blot it out.” Id.  
 87. David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free 
Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REV. 47, 58–61 (1992). 
 88. Id. at 58. 
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few references to sexual activity and no passages that could 
conceivably be considered prurient or titillating.  
 According to Heywood, the institution of marriage allowed “the 
legalized slavery of women,” the “idea that women belong to men” 
as a form of property. The “great social fraud” marriage made sex a 
“marketable commodity.” A prostitute may be bought for a night, 
but a wife “becomes a ‘prostitute’ for life.” Heywood regarded 
marriage and capitalism as “twin relic[s] of barbarism.” The profit 
system and marriage, both sanctioned by the state, robbed 
individuals of their personal sovereignty.  
 Heywood asserted that “the right of private judgment, which is 
conceded in politics and religion,” should be extended to domestic 
life as well. He regarded “sexual self-government,” the right of 
individuals to determine for themselves “when, where, and how” 
their sexual organs will be used, as a key component of “Personal 
Liberty and the Rights of Conscience.” “If government cannot justly 
determine what ticket we shall vote, what church we shall attend, or 
what books we shall read,” Heywood asked, “by what authority 
does it watch at key-holes and burst open bed-chamber doors to 
drag lovers from sacred seclusion?”89  
Rabban’s conclusion that Cupid’s Yokes contained “no passages that 
could conceivably be considered prurient or titillating” is certainly true. 
The pamphlet was a polemic pure and simple, advocating libertarian ideas 
that surely offended most people in 1876 and some of which would offend 
many people today. But they were nonetheless ideas. The tone of the 
pamphlet is preachy. It probably works better in a speech than read. 
Examples of statements that might have attracted prosecution are: 
 The Free Love faith proclaims the fact that persons recognized in 
law as capable of making a sexual contract are, when wiser by 
experience, morally able to dissolve that contract; and that Passion 
is not so depraved as to be incapable of redemption and self-
government. 
 Marriage, then, being the creature of men’s law, we have the 
same right to alter or abolish it that we have respecting any other 
human institution. The principles of Nature derived from a careful 
 
 
 89. Id. at 62 (footnotes omitted). 
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study of essential liberty and equity are a safer guide than crude 
social codes which come to us from the ignorant and despotic past. 
 It is admitted that, if the previous partners in her bed are 
divorced by death or other cause, a woman may truly love and 
wisely marry the second or fifth man; but the purity of her love for 
the fifth man is not determined by the previous four being dead or 
divorced; were they all living and her personal friends, she can love 
the last man as truly as she loved the first.  
 Love is not burnt out in one honeymoon, or satisfied by one 
lover; the secret history of the human heart proves that it is capable 
of loving any number of times and persons, and that the more it 
loves the more it can love. This is the law of Nature, thrust out of 
sight and condemned by common consent, yet secretly known to all. 
Variety is as beautiful and useful in love as in eating and drinking. 
The one-love theory, based on jealously, comes not from loving 
hearts, but from the greedy claimant. 
 The eye, the arm, or leg perishes by non-use; so without natural 
vent, exuberant sexual vitality wastes and destroys. 
 Why should the right of private judgment, which is conceded in 
politics and religion, be denied to domestic life? . . . Why should 
priests and magistrates supervise the Sexual Organs of citizens any 
more than the brain and stomach? If we are incapable of sexual self-
government, is the matter helped by appointing to “protect” us, 
“ministers of the Gospel,” whose incontinent lives fill the world 
with “scandals?”90  
Comstock, whose law and goals Heywood criticized in the pamphlet, 
instigated a successful federal criminal prosecution in Massachusetts for 
posting the pamphlet in the United States mail.91 Heywood was sent to 
 
 
 90. E.H. HEYWOOD, CUPID’S YOKES: OR THE BINDING FORCES OF CONJUGAL LIFE 5, 6, 13, 14, 
17, 21 (1877) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). A further subtitle for the pamphlet is: “An Essay 
to Consider some Moral and Physiological Phases of Love and Marriage, Wherein is Asserted the 
Natural Right and Necessity of Sexual Self-Government.” 
 91. On Comstock’s power of arrest as a “special agent” of the post office, see JAMES PAUL & 
MURRAY SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP: OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL 24 (1961); Margaret A. 
Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression versus the Desire to Sanitize 
Society—From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741, 748 (1992); Michael 
T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 
263, 304–05 n.296 (1986). 
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prison for two years.92 Thereafter, Bennett, whom Rabban describes as the 
“leader of the most militantly antireligious and socially radical wing of the 
freethought movement,”93 took up Heywood’s cause, not because Bennett 
agreed with all of Heywood’s ideas about free love but, like a good civil 
libertarian, because he wanted to support Heywood’s right to express his 
views in a publication that Bennett did not consider obscene.94 Comstock 
then arrested Bennett. A New York federal jury convicted him of mailing 
the pamphlet. The sentence was thirteen months.95 Why was Bennett’s 
sentence less than Heywood’s for the same act? Perhaps because Bennett 
was not the author, or because he did not agree with all of Heywood’s 
views, or because his purpose in mailing the pamphlet was specifically to 
challenge the law, or simply because the judge was different. We cannot 
know. 
Much of the appellate opinion affirming Bennett’s conviction is taken 
up with deciding whether the indictment had to repeat the language 
charged as obscene.96 It did not, said the court, so long as the defendant 
was able to learn of the allegedly obscene parts, as through a bill of 
particulars, which Bennett had not bothered to request.97 Several other 
holdings are more immediate to this study. The trial judge told the jury 
that (1) the pamphlet was obscene if “any substantial part of it, [was] 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, or of an indecent character;”98 (2) ”Freelovers 
and freethinkers have a right to their views, and they may express them, 
and they may publish them; but they cannot publish them in connection 
with obscene matter, and then send [them] through the mails;”99 (3) a work 
can be obscene even though it contains no obscene words because the 
“question is as to the idea which is conveyed in the words that are 
used;”100 (4) the jury had to decide whether the “tendency of the matter is 
to deprave and corrupt the morals of those whose minds are open to such 
 
 
 92. Rabban, supra note 87, at 64. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 65. 
 95. Id.  
 96. United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1095–98 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571). 
 97. Id. (citing case law from England, Massachusetts, Michigan, Vermont, Illinois, and other 
American jurisdictions). Omission of the offensive language from the text of the indictment did not 
prejudice the defendant, who “had information given to him as to the offence charged, by the date of 
the mailing, by the title of the book, and by the address on the wrapper.” Id. at 1098. The defendant 
could have obtained a copy of the book, with the obscene passages designated “by asking for a bill of 
particulars.” Id.  
 98. Id. at 1102. 
 99. Id. at 1101. 
 100. Id. at 1102. 
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influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall;”101 
and (5) a work is obscene “if it would suggest impure and libidinous 
thoughts in the young and the inexperienced.”102 The second, third, and 
fifth instructions are contradictory, if not logically then practically. How 
can “freelovers and freethinkers” publish their views on marriage and 
sexuality if these views can be declared obscene, even without obscene 
words, or if the authors can then be prosecuted for an “idea” that “would 
suggest impure and libidinous thoughts in the young and inexperienced?” 
Without recognizing it, or if recognized without acknowledging it, Bennett 
affirmed a conviction for conveying ideas, in unobjectionable language, 
because of the “impure” thoughts they would “suggest” in a population 
seen as particularly susceptible.  
 Regarding the charge that the work would be obscene if “any 
substantial part” was such, the prosecutor had marked certain passages and 
the court instructed the jurors that they “may confine their attention to the 
marked passages. It is upon those passages alone that this case must 
turn.”103 On the issue of whose minds might be depraved by the marked 
passages, the trial judge was quite clear that the jurors were not to consider 
their own minds but rather, and almost tautologically, “the minds of those 
open to such influences and into whose hands a publication of this 
character might come.”104 How the jury was to know the operation of the 
minds of these individuals is incomprehensible, especially as no expert 
testimony was then (or for decades following) permitted in obscenity 
prosecutions, not that it is clear who such an expert might have been at the 
time.  
 Last, an issue that would loom in years ahead was the state of mind 
that the prosecution had to prove. As in Hicklin, the jury was told that 
Bennett’s motive was irrelevant.105 But the prosecution had to show that 
Bennett acted “knowingly” because that was what the statute required. It 
was not enough to prove that Bennett knew that he mailed the work. He 
had to know its contents. But this turned out not to be an issue because, as 
the court told the jury, the fact that the defendant “knew what the book 
 
 
 101. Id. The court articulated this standard in various ways. For example, shortly thereafter the 
court told the jury that “[p]assages are indecent within the meaning of this act, when they tend to 
obscenity—that is to say, matter having that form of indecency which is calculated to promote the 
general corruption of morals.” Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 1102. 
 105. Id. (“The question is, whether this man mailed an obscene book; not why he mailed it. His 
motive may have been ever so pure; if the book he mailed was obscene, he is guilty.”). 
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was that he mailed was not controverted.”106 Nor did the jury have to find 
that Bennett meant to mail an obscene book. Regardless of his motives, 
and even if he actually believed the book was not obscene, the jury could 
convict him if it found the marked passages obscene, as the court defined 
that term.  
The circuit court approved all of the instructions, citing Hicklin.107 
Indeed, Hicklin was its primary authority for the definition of obscenity. 
No American appellate precedent was cited on the question. The only 
other authorities cited were a second English case that relied on Hicklin108 
and the trial judge’s charge to the jury in the prosecution of Ezra 
Heywood, which seems to have afforded Heywood even less protection 
than the Hicklin standard. In Heywood, the judge told the jury that it “may 
consider . . . whether [certain books] excite impure desires in the minds of 
the boys and girls or other persons who are susceptible to such impure 
thoughts and desires.”109 This had to be the test because “[i]f any other 
standard were adopted, probably no book would be obscene, because there 
would be some men and women so pure, perhaps, that it would not excite 
an impure thought.”110 The only options, in other words, were either to 
weigh the effect of the book on children or on someone “so pure,” and the 
latter was unacceptable because then “probably no book would be 
obscene.”111  
The Bennett trial judge slightly altered the Hicklin definition of 
obscenity. In Hicklin, Cockburn had said: 
I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the 
matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose 
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a 
publication of this sort may fall.112  
In Bennett the trial judge told the jury that the test of obscenity was  
whether the tendency of the matter is to deprave and corrupt the 
morals of those whose minds are open to such influences, and into 
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.113  
 
 
 106. Id. at 1101. 
 107. Id. at 1104. 
 108. Id. (citing Steele v. Brannan, [1872] 7 L.R.C.P. 261). 
 109. Id. at 1105 (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. R v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (emphasis added). 
 113. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. at 1102 (emphasis added). 
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The Bennett charge omitted the words “charged as obscenity” and the 
word “immoral” and inserted “the morals of” after “corrupt.” A small 
distinction, but now the jury was asked about the corrupting effect on a 
reader’s “morals,” not the reader as such. The circuit court wrote that the 
“meaning of the two sentences is identical.”114  
If Hicklin was bad for writers and publishers, Bennett was worse 
because of the far tamer content of Cupid’s Yokes. While Hicklin reported 
confessional dialogue that was fairly explicit, if only in a roundabout way, 
Cupid’s Yokes contained nothing of the kind. If it offended, it was because 
of its ideas. The effect of Bennett was to warn polemicists that discussion 
in print of socially radical views about sex and marriage, and especially of 
the former outside the latter, was punishable as a crime regardless of the 
language used. Although the pamphlet in the prosecutions of Bennett and 
Heywood had been mailed, thereby providing federal jurisdiction, 
distribution of allegedly obscene matter outside the mails could be 
punished under state law.115  
C. The Prosecution of August Muller of Barclay Street 
[The] object of the statute was to . . . protect the community against 
. . . contamination and pollution.116  
The 1884 opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in People v. 
Muller marks Hicklin’s first appellate appearance in a New York obscenity 
case.117 August Muller was convicted for selling obscene photographs of 
 
 
 114. Id. at 1104. 
 115. Prior to 1934, when the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Woolsey’s decision admitting Ulysses 
into the United States, Bennett did not have significant influence, but it had some. The United States 
Supreme Court cited it mainly on the issue of what an obscenity indictment must allege to constitute 
proper notice. Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 39 (1896). But Rosen also approved of the trial 
court’s jury charge, which rested on Hicklin. See infra text accompanying notes 401–05. No majority 
opinion of the New York Court of Appeals cited Bennett for the definition of obscenity. A New York 
appellate court relied on its definition once. People v. Pesky, 243 N.Y.S. 193, 196 (App. Div. 1930). 
See also Dreiser v. John Lane Co., 171 N.Y.S. 605, 606 (App. Div. 1918) (dicta). In the Second 
Circuit, Bennett remained good law until 1930, although that was not apparent until 1934, when 
United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934), 
concluded that United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930), was “inconsistent with” Bennett. 
Two years later, Learned Hand held that Dennett, which his cousin Augustus wrote, had in fact 
overruled Bennett. United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936). Levine also concluded 
that the New York Court of Appeals had also rejected Bennett, in effect though not by name, in Halsey 
v. N.Y. Society for the Suppression of Vice, 136 N.E. 219 (N.Y. 1922), decided nineteen months after 
the convictions of Anderson and Heap.  
 116. People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408, 413 (1884). 
 117. The first appearance of Hicklin in a New York Court of Appeals opinion occurs in Gardner 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 215 Gillers book pages.doc1/14/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
240 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 85:215 
 
 
 
 
paintings in a store on Barclay Street in lower Manhattan. The court 
paraphrased the Hicklin test and approved its use for photographs. No 
other judicial authority is cited in the opinion and the sole non-judicial 
authority is an evidence treatise,118 cited for the proposition that Muller 
was not entitled to call expert witnesses. The trial court had refused to 
allow Muller to call an artist and a student of art to testify to what artists 
understood to be the difference “between pure art and obscene and 
indecent art.”119 Some forty years later, in the first Ulysses case, Jane Heap 
would echo the legitimacy of the implied claim that art and obscenity are 
mutually exclusive categories,120 and more than three decades after that, 
the United States Supreme Court would largely agree.121 Eventually, too, 
expert testimony would be permitted to assist juries in deciding whether a 
writing or image was obscene.122  
 
 
v. People, 62 N.Y. 299 (1875). But Gardner was not an obscenity case. Hicklin was cited on an 
evidentiary issue. After Muller, Hicklin did not again appear in a Court of Appeals opinion until 1922, 
when the dissent cited it in Halsey. 136 N.E. at 221. Halsey is further discussed infra at text 
accompanying notes 233–39. Hicklin next appeared in a majority opinion of the Court in 1953, when 
Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Bd. of Regents, 305 N.Y. 336 (1953), upheld the refusal of the Board of 
Regents to license “La Ronde” for exhibition. The United States Supreme Court reversed in Superior 
Films, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Ohio Div. of Film Censorship, 346 U.S. 587 (1954). The Court of 
Appeals’ two citations to Hicklin after 1953 are for historical reasons only, not as authority. See People 
v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 584 (1961); Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the 
Univ. of N.Y., 3 N.Y.2d 237, 242 (1957). The last time Hicklin appeared in any reported New York 
State case was 1970, where the trial court cited it in finding an issue of “Zap Comix No. 4” obscene. 
People v. Kirkpatrick, 316 N.Y.S.2d 37, 45 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970), aff’d, 329 N.Y.S.2d 769 (App. Div. 
1971). But here, too, it is cited only for historical purposes and not as authority. 
 118. The citation is to Greenleaf on Evidence. Muller, 96 N.Y. at 412 (citing SIMON GREENLEAF, 
GREENLEAF EVIDENCE, § 440). 
 119. Muller, 96 N.Y. at 411. 
 120. See infra text accompanying notes 220–21. 
 121. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 
(1964). See also FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 136–39 (1976). Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15 (1973), cut back on the explicit holding of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 
(1966), that art and obscenity are hermitically distinct categories—that is, if it is art it cannot be 
obscene. Miller exempted literary and artistic efforts from the reach of obscenity laws only if they had 
“serious . . . value.” Miller, 413 U.S. at 22–25 (emphasis added). 
 122. As early as 1894, however, just a decade after Muller, New York judges themselves cited the 
opinions of literary critics. In re Worthington Co., 30 N.Y.S. 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1894) (regarding 
“Arabian Nights,” “Tom Jones,” Rabelais, Ovid’s “Art of Love,” and the Confessions of Rousseau, 
among other works). So too did the appellate court in St. Hubert Guild v. Quinn, 118 N.Y.S. 582 (N.Y. 
App. Term 1909) (regarding Voltaire’s “The Maid of Orleans,” and “The Philosophical Dictionary”). 
The New York Court of Appeals cited expert opinion in Halsey, 136 N.E. at 220. See also People ex 
rel. Kahan v. Creative Age Press, Inc., 79 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1948). In the prosecution of 
the editors of The Little Review for publishing an excerpt from Ulysses, then a work in progress, the 
New York Court of Special Sessions did allow at least two experts, but they did not make much of an 
impression. See infra text accompanying notes 196–99 and 306–08. In a roundabout way, expert views 
were made available to the court a decade later in the effort to win the right to import Ulysses into the 
United States. United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff’d 72 
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). See infra text accompanying notes 307–08, 334–37.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/1
p 215 Gillers book pages.doc1/14/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] A TENDENCY TO DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT 241 
 
 
 
 
But in 1884, the New York court (and others) thought otherwise. “To 
permit such evidence would put the witness in the place of the jury,” it 
wrote, “and the latter would have no function to discharge. The testimony 
of experts is not admissible upon matters of judgment within the 
knowledge and experience of ordinary jurymen.”123  
The Court of Appeals summarized the facts: 
The evidence on the trial in support of the indictment related to nine 
photographs produced before the jury, which were proved to have 
been sold by the defendant in the ordinary course of his 
employment as a clerk in a store for the sale of books, pictures and 
photographs, in the city of New York. The record contains no 
special description of the photographs, except that it appears that 
they represented nude females, and were photographic copies of 
paintings which had been exhibited in the Salon in Paris, and one of 
them at the centennial exhibition in Philadelphia, and that among 
them were pictures designated “La Asphyxie,” “After the Bath,” 
and “La Baigneuse.”124  
As the case came to New York’s highest court, the remaining legal 
issues were few. The alleged obscenity of the photographs was not an 
issue because defense counsel had not “furnished them as a part of the 
record,” leaving the judges “unable to pass upon the question of their 
obscenity or indecency.”125 That made the court’s citation to Hicklin’s test 
for obscenity wholly gratuitous. It had no need to consider whether the 
photographs were obscene. Unfortunately, this aspect of Muller seems to 
have escaped the attention of later courts. With the question of obscenity 
out of the picture, the only remaining questions of note were the 
admissibility of expert testimony and whether the state had to prove that 
Muller intended to sell obscene photographs. The court said proof of 
“special intent” to sell obscene pictures was not required, citing Hicklin 
here as well.126 The state only had to show that Muller sold the paintings 
and that they were obscene.127 (Nonetheless, the trial judge did allow 
 
 
 123. Muller, 96 N.Y. at 412 (citations omitted). 
 124. Id. at 409–10. “La Baigneuse,” painted by Leon Jean Basile Perrault, is described at infra text 
accompanying note 139. August Muller was twenty-two years old when he was arrested. JANE CLAPP, 
ART CENSORSHIP: A CHRONOLOGY OF PROSCRIBED AND PRESCRIBED ART 157 (1972). 
 125. Muller, 96 N.Y. at 410. 
 126. Id. at 413. 
 127. Id. at 411. The opinion is not entirely clear. The court may have confused intent and motive 
or it may have meant to say that it was only necessary to prove that Muller intended to sell the pictures 
he sold, not that he had the specific intent to sell obscene pictures. The element of state of mind is 
addressed at infra text accompanying notes 130–37. 
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Anthony Comstock to testify that a year earlier he had bought Balzac’s 
“Droll Stories” at Muller’s shop, a prior act apparently offered to prove 
that Muller specifically intended to sell an obscene work.)128 Having 
negated “special intent” as an element of the crime, the court then 
muddied the analysis in two other parts of its opinion. In one, it focused on 
the photographs of the paintings, not their creators, and seemed to imply 
that they could be capable of having a “motive.” After stating the Hicklin 
test for obscenity in print, the court wrote: 
We think it would also be a proper test of obscenity in a painting or 
statue, whether the motive of the painting or statue, so to speak, as 
indicated by it, is pure or impure, whether it is naturally calculated 
to excite in a spectator impure imaginations, and whether the other 
incidents and qualities, however attractive, were merely accessory 
to this as the primary or main purposes of the representation.129  
By seeming to divorce the obscenity question from the mind of the 
author or distributor, by speaking of the work as though it had a “motive,” 
the court treated the litigation as one for forfeiture of a dangerous 
instrumentality. Indeed, the court wrote that “[t]he object of the statute 
was to suppress the traffic in obscene publications, and to protect the 
community against the contamination and pollution arising from their 
exhibition and distribution.”130 The obscene object is implicitly analogized 
to tainted food or a contagious disease, an analogy that also appeared in 
Justice Blackburn’s opinion in Hicklin.131 In this view, the creator’s intent 
or motive would seem to be irrelevant. Tainted food and a contagious 
disease were evil in themselves and had to be stopped. 
But then, in what might be seen as a complete reversal, the court 
identified a circumstance in which the motive or specific intent of the 
author or distributor will be critical. Whether a particular item is obscene, 
it wrote, “may in some cases depend on circumstances.”132 The court 
mentioned a “medical book for the instruction of medical men,” which 
“may contain illustrations suitable and proper as a part of the work, but 
which, if detached and published alone for circulation, might be deemed 
indecent within the statute.”133 Years later, the Supreme Court would also 
 
 
 128. Pictures Held to be Impure: Mr. Comstock Not Well Informed as to Balzac, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
19, 1883, at 3. 
 129. Muller, 96 N.Y. at 411 (emphasis added). 
 130. Id. at 413 (emphasis added). 
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 70–75. 
 132. Muller, 96 N.Y. at 413. 
 133. Id. The example of medical books repeatedly presented a quandary for courts in the early 
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identify the manner in which material is marketed as relevant in an 
obscenity prosecution.134 
In Muller, the seller’s motive or specific intent then is not wholly 
irrelevant. A medical book publisher might cite a motive to train doctors in 
defense of an obscenity charge. Whether that defense would establish that 
the material was not obscene because of the limited distribution, or 
whether it would instead establish that although the material was obscene 
the defendant could not be prosecuted for obscenity because of a 
benevolent motive, is not always clear. In any event, a limited distribution 
defense was unavailable to Muller because it had “no relation to the issue” 
in the case.135 Why not? Because “[t]he pictures in question were kept for 
general sale, except that they were not sold to boys under twenty-one years 
of age.”136 The implication is that they were not sold to women of any age 
or that no women would wish to buy them. But any adult male could buy 
them. Again we see an echo of Hicklin, where Scott distributed “The 
Confessional Unmasked” to any pedestrian with a shilling to buy a 
copy.137  
One wonders what the result in Muller would have been if the 
photographs were sold only to serious art students who could produce a 
note from their teacher. Would they still be obscene? Although the Court 
of Appeals did not discuss that question, the trial judge might then have 
allowed a defense: “In charging the jury Judge Brady said that the purity 
or indecency of a picture depended entirely on the manner of its 
exhibition. If it were, by that manner, calculated to arouse immoral 
thoughts, it would be indecent.”138 In this view, context would either mean 
that an item was not obscene or it would be a defense to prosecution even 
if the item was obscene. Comstock himself thought context mattered. He 
distinguished between original paintings, which he did not prosecute, and 
photographic copies, which, he said, were sold “wholesale at fifty cents a 
piece to small dealers” who then sell them to “our youth—boys and 
girls—and by these very sales encourage that very lasciviousness against 
 
 
obscenity cases. If certain explicit depictions of sex or sex organs are obscene, then why wouldn’t they 
also be obscene even in the hands of medical students and physicians? And yet courts were obviously 
unwilling to ban research and treatment in the field. That, in turn, forced courts to view the issue of 
obscenity contextually, at least to this limited extent. But once courts concluded that context matters, 
they had to grapple with the extent to which it matters. 
 134. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). 
 135. Muller, 96 N.Y. at 413. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 65–66.  
 138. Pictures Held to be Impure, supra note 128. 
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which the law is provided.”139 In his book Morals vs. Art, Comstock wrote 
that the nude “figure thus exhibited to cultured minds in an art gallery, 
where it legitimately belongs, is a very different thing from what it appears 
to be to the common mind on the public streets in the shape of a 
photograph.”140 Even to Comstock, the location and identity of the 
intended audience counted, although the extent to which Comstock 
thought it should matter became murkier in the Knoedler case, discussed 
below. 
Aside from intent and motive is the question of knowledge. Muller was 
only a store clerk. One issue that might have arisen but did not was 
whether he even knew the content of the photographs. But the nine 
photographs were apparently offered for sale as individual items, not in a 
book with a cover. An agent of the Society for the Suppression of Vice 
testified that the pictures “were taken from a drawer by Muller, the 
inference being that they were kept concealed, because they were known 
to be obscene, until they were called for.”141 Muller claimed the pictures 
were not taken from a drawer, but were hung on the shop walls with other 
pictures.142 In any event, because Muller knew what the photographs were 
photographs of and because there were no special “circumstances” that 
would permit Muller to compare himself to (say) publishers of medical 
books, the only issue for the jury was whether they were obscene—and 
that was not an issue for the Court of Appeals because the pictures were 
not before it. 
Muller can be seen as a quite unremarkable decision for the time, given 
its narrow focus. But even in 1884, we see the stirrings of judicial 
discomfort with the reach of the concept of obscenity, at least in New 
York. The fact that the obscene matter consisted of photographs of 
recognized French paintings143—whose judicial suppression could easily 
lead to harsh caricatures about American “prudery”—may explain this 
passage in the court’s opinion: 
 
 
 139. NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY REPRODUCTION 
IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 177–78 (1997). 
 140. Id. (citing ANTHONY COMSTOCK, MORALS VS. ART 8–9 (1887)). 
 141. Pictures of a Doubtful Kind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1883, at 3. 
 142. Id. 
 143. The court wrote that some of the “paintings had been exhibited in the Salon in Paris, and one 
of them at the centennial exhibition in Philadelphia.” People v. Muller, 96 N.Y. 408, 410 (1884). The 
painters, however, are not well known to the public today. So far as can be determined, the paintings 
were “La Asphyxie” by Cherubino Pata, “After the Bath” by Joseph Wencker, “La Baigneuse” by 
Leon Jean Basile Perrault, and “La Repose” by Chambord. CLAPP, supra note 124, at 157 (1972). 
“Eight of the nine pictures had been exhibited at the Salon in Paris, and the remaining canvas at the 
Centennial Art Exhibition in Philadelphia,” according to Clapp. Id. 
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It is evident that mere nudity in painting or sculpture is not 
obscenity. Some of the great works in painting and sculpture as all 
know represent nude human forms. It is a false delicacy and mere 
prudery which would condemn and banish from sight all such 
objects as obscene, simply on account of their nudity. If the test of 
obscenity or indecency in a picture or statue is its capability of 
suggesting impure thoughts, then indeed all such representations 
might be considered as indecent or obscene. The presence of a 
woman of the purest character and of the most modest behavior and 
bearing may suggest to a prurient imagination images of lust, and 
excite impure desires, and so may a picture or statue not in fact 
indecent or obscene.144  
What does the court mean? What is the definition of “mere nudity”? 
We can only guess. The paradox of Muller is this: while affirming the 
misdemeanor conviction, the court excluded “mere nudity” in an image 
from the reach of the obscenity laws. The opinion both suppresses and 
protects. This protection will shortly appear in the prosecution of a 
prominent art dealer who also sold photographs of French paintings. That 
prosecution,145 like Muller’s, was instigated by the Society for the 
Suppression of Vice, and it targeted photographs of at least some (or 
perhaps all) of the same paintings that led to Muller’s conviction.  
Of course, exemption of “mere nudity” from the definition of obscenity 
only makes sense in representational art, not in literature. If nudity alone is 
not obscene in a painting, and putting aside the depiction of sex acts 
themselves, what would make a painting that contained a nude form 
obscene? One answer, judging from the prosecution of the Knoedler 
Gallery, discussed next, may be the story the painting means to tell.146 In 
that sense, pictorial representations can be analogized to printed matter. A 
painting, like a book, can tell a story, although constructing the story of a 
painting will often require greater viewer participation than is demanded 
of the reader of a book. Some viewers (or readers) may infer an erotic 
story that others do not and which the artist did not even intend. In that 
case, who is the author of the obscenity, the creator or her audience? And 
can the audience’s interpretation be attributed to the creator for purposes 
 
 
 144. Muller, 96 N.Y. at 411. 
 145. See infra text accompanying notes 147–62. 
 146. Other answers are where the picture is sold or exhibited and the social class of the seller and 
buyer. See infra text accompanying notes 153–55. 
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of criminal liability? The early cases answer the latter question 
affirmatively, if for “audience” we substitute jurors. 
D. The Prosecution of a Respectable House: Edmund Knoedler of Fifth 
Avenue  
Muller’s observation that “mere nudity” is not obscene did not help 
August Muller because the issue of the photographs’ obscenity was not 
before the court. But only three years later, the observation did help 
Edmund Knoedler and M. Knoedler & Co., an art gallery on Fifth Avenue 
and Twenty-second Street, described by the New York Times as a 
“respectable house which has furnished respectable citizens with good 
pictures for more than a generation.”147 The Knoedler case, an epilogue to 
Muller, so close in time, suggests that the identity of the defendant and his 
clients does matter. Comstock took pains to exploit the hypocrisy.  
After Comstock’s agent purchased 117 photographs of French 
paintings from the gallery, Edmund Knoedler and his clerk, George 
Pfeiffer, were arrested.148 The Times, which had not addressed the 
prosecution of Muller, except to report it, published editorials harshly 
criticizing Comstock’s action. “The impertinence of reformers of that 
stamp,” it wrote, “who are themselves coarse and fancy that all other 
people must see things through their own vulgar spectacles, is 
unfortunately by no means a new thing in the world.”149 In a letter to the 
paper, officers of the Society for the Suppression of Vice, including 
Samuel Colgate, its president, wrote that the decision to arrest Knoedler 
had been made not by Comstock but by the Executive Committee of the 
Society, that the judge issuing the arrest warrant had inspected the pictures 
before doing so, that Knoedler had been warned that the pictures were 
obscene and given a copy of the obscenity statute, and most striking, that 
“[s]ome of the pictures, for the sale of which the dealer was arrested, have 
been legally adjudicated to be ‘indecent’ and ‘obscene’” by the New York 
courts, including the Court of Appeals.150 This is an unmistakable 
 
 
 147. The Comstock Nuisance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1887, at 4. M. Knoedler & Co. was founded 
in 1846 and remains in business on the upper eastside of Manhattan. See Knoedler & Co., 
http://www.knoedlergallery.com/gallery.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2007). 
 148. Mr. Comstock’s Work: Beginning a Prosecution Against a Prominent Art Firm, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 1887, at 3. 
 149. The Comstock Nuisance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1887, at 4. 
 150. Samuel Colgate et al., Letter to the Editor, Mr. Comstock’s Society, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 
1887, at 9. 
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reference to Muller. Comstock also implied, in a letter and a speech, that 
the Court of Appeals had already found some of the pictures obscene.151  
This last claim is, of course, entirely incorrect. The New York Court of 
Appeals affirmed Muller’s conviction but it did not address the issue of 
obscenity of the pictures because the pictures were not before it.152 The 
lower courts, however, had looked at the pictures and allowed the jury’s 
verdict to stand.153 That fact gave Comstock a basis to argue before a 
friendly meeting of Baptist ministers:  
“Now,” Mr. Comstock went on, “if these pictures [seized from 
Muller] were indictable on Barclay Street they are indictable on 
Fifth Avenue. If it was our duty to arrest and convict the poor 
vendor on Barclay Street, our duty is equally plain toward the rich 
one on Fifth Avenue. We are not striking at men, but at a violation 
of the law. . . .”154  
To which, what could his critics, who were silent during his 
prosecution of Muller, possibly reply? Could it be that in Edmund 
Knoedler’s possession the pictures were not obscene, but in August 
Muller’s possession they were? Comstock and his Society thought not. 
Others might disagree on the ground of the intended distribution. Knoedler 
& Co. served the upper classes. Muller’s customers, they might claim, 
were not motivated to buy photographs of pictures of naked women 
because they appreciated French art. The courts that decided the two cases 
did not explicitly adopt this distinction, but the different clientele could 
explain the difference in the press reaction to Comstock’s prosecutions. Is 
that a distinction the law wished to make? Comstock’s retort called the 
question. 
 
 
 151. Anthony Comstock, Comstock on Art: An Explanatory Letter Concerning the Recent Arrests 
in this City, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1887, at 3; Sustaining Mr. Comstock: Baptist Ministers on the Nude 
in Art, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1887, at 2.  
 152. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
 153. Samuel Colgate’s letter to the New York Times quotes the intermediate appellate court in 
Muller as follows:  
The pictures produced upon the trial have been handed up on the argument of the appeal as 
they had been marked as exhibits upon the trial. They are pictures of nude females in a variety 
of attitudes and postures, which the jury might very well and naturally would determine to be 
both indecent and obscene in their character. Ordinarily they would be so pronounced, 
although they would not exert the same demoralizing and sensuous effects upon all persons 
alike.  
Samuel Colgate, supra note 150, at 9 (quoting People v. Muller, 32 Hun 209 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1884)). 
 154. Sustaining Mr. Comstock, supra note 151. 
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Knoedler and his clerk fared much better than Muller. As the case 
advanced, the offending photographs were reduced from the 117 seized to 
only thirty-seven and the court later dismissed the complaint against 
thirty-five of them, leaving two for trial.155 Among the thirty-five 
dismissed paintings were at least four that appear to have secured Muller’s 
conviction.156 One of these is “La Baigneuse” (“The Bather”) by Leon 
Jean Basile Perrault (1832–1908). It is a painting of a naked young woman 
lying on a hammock with her arms above her head. Her legs are dangling 
over the edge of the hammock. One foot is touching the ground. Her head 
is turned toward the viewer but she is not looking at the viewer. She 
appears deep in thought. Her body is entirely exposed except that because 
of her angle, and because her legs are pressed together, her vaginal area is 
not exposed.  
Nicola Beisel reports that of the two Knoedler paintings warranting a 
trial, “Entre 5 et 6 heures en Breda Street” appears to have been lost, but 
she writes that Breda Street was a center of Parisian prostitution.157 The 
other painting, “Rolla” by Henri Gervex (1852–1929), is loosely based on 
an 1833 poem of the same name by Alfred De Musset (1810–1857).158 The 
picture portrays a young man standing by an open window in a 
comfortable hotel room on a bright morning. On the bed is Marion (or 
Marie), a beautiful, high-priced courtesan on whom Rolla has spent all his 
money.159 The picture shows Marion asleep, nude, lying provocatively 
 
 
 155. The Knoedler Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1888, at 8. 
 156. See supra text accompanying note 143. 
 157. BEISEL, supra note 139, at 190. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Excerpts from the poem, translated from the French, follow: 
With a melancholy eye Rolla gazed on  
The beautiful Marion asleep in her wide bed; 
In spite of himself, an unnameable and diabolical horror 
Made him tremble to the bone. 
Marion had cost dearly.—To pay for his night 
He had spent his last coins. 
His friends knew it. And he, on arriving,  
Had taken their hand and given his word that 
In the morning no one would see him alive. 
. . . 
When Rolla saw the sun appear on the roofs, 
He went and leaned out the window. 
. . . 
Rolla turned to look at Marie. . 
She felt exhausted, and had fallen asleep. 
And thus both fled the cruelties of fate, 
The child in sleep, and the man in death!  
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across the bed, one leg dangling over the side. She is entirely exposed to 
view except that a small corner of a sheet covers her vaginal area. The 
picture may be mildly erotic, not because of the nudity but because of 
Marion’s pose. It is not explicit, but it could be seen as provocative. It is 
much like “La Baigneuse” if the viewer looks only at the female figure. 
Why did the court then dismiss the charge against “La Baigneuse” but not 
“Rolla”? Perhaps the court did so because the woman in “Rolla” is a 
courtesan (although a viewer unfamiliar with the poem might not realize 
that). Also, “Rolla” has a man in the picture; a man who implicitly has just 
spent the night with the sleeping, naked woman. “La Baigneuse” has only 
a solitary nude woman, on a hammock, not in a hotel room. These 
differences might have led the court to conclude that a jury could find 
“Rolla” obscene because “Rolla” told a story. A viewer could infer the 
nature of the relationship between the man and the woman and perhaps 
imminent tragic consequence. (In the poem, Rolla kills himself by taking 
poison.) It is a tale of debauchery (sex for hire) followed by suicide. “La 
Baigneuse” by contrast offers no “before and after” story, let alone one 
that a judge might find morally questionable. There is no suggestion that 
anything untoward had just occurred or was about to occur. In concluding 
that a jury could find that “Rolla” was obscene, the court would find 
support from the Salon of Paris, which in 1878 refused to show the 
picture.160  
The disposition of the Knoedler case does not appear in the official 
records. We may assume that the parties reached a resolution, perhaps one 
that did not entail conviction, or at least did not involve jail. Jane Clapp 
writes that each defendant was fined $300.161 But what is most interesting 
about the prosecution, beyond the differences in the amount of respectable 
public criticism of Comstock (none for the prosecution of Muller, vocal on 
behalf of Knoedler three years later), is the reason the trial judge gave for 
dismissing the complaint against thirty-five of thirty-seven photographs. 
According to one news report of the time, “[t]he Judge held that the mere 
 
 
Alfred De Musset, Rolla (1833), in HOLLIS CLAYSON, PAINTED LOVE 81 (2003). Clayson tells the 
history of the painting, its critical reception, and how it deviates from the poem’s descriptions of the 
the hotel room and Marion. Id. at 79–90.  
 160. BEISEL, supra note 139, at 190. Both pictures may be found on various Internet sites. “La 
Baigneuse” is available at http://www.artxchangenetwork.com/Picture.aspx?idPicture=3092 (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2007). “Rolla” is available at http://jssgallery.org/Other_Artists/Henri_Gervex/ 
Gervex_Rolla.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2007).  
 161. CLAPP, supra note 124, at 161. Nicola Beisel reports that “[m]ost histories of the case claim 
that the defendants were fined three hundred dollars, which was the amount of their bail, so perhaps 
Knoedler and his assistant decided to forgo a trial.” BEISEL, supra note 139, at 250 n.123. 
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portrayal of the nude in art, so long as there was nothing wrong in the 
motive, was not an infringement of the law, quoting [People v. Muller] in 
support of this opinion.”162 August Muller’s loss led to Edmund 
Knoedler’s (substantial) victory. But we remain in the dark about what the 
court means by “nothing wrong in the motive” or how it reaches that 
conclusion. 
IV. WHO’S AFRAID OF GERTY AND MOLLY? THE TWO TRIALS OF 
ULYSSES  
A. People v. Anderson and Heap 
Hicklin, Bennett, and Muller largely defined New York’s obscenity law 
when, in 1920, Ulysses first came to the attention of the state’s courts. Of 
course, there were other state obscenity prosecutions in the interim. Some 
lower courts showed greater tolerance for candor about sex, as discussed 
hereafter.163 But no case had redrawn the legal map of these three 
precedents when, on September 29, 1920, John S. Sumner, the second 
Secretary of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, purchased 
copies of the July–August issue of The Little Review in a Greenwich 
Village bookstore.164  
With almost no money, Margaret Caroline Anderson, then 27, started 
The Little Review in Chicago in March 1914.165 The magazine moved to 
New York in 1917.166 The Little Review, twenty-five cents an issue, 
published good poets and writers, the already famous, and the soon-to-be-
famous: Ezra Pound, Ford Madox Huefer (who had changed his name 
from Ford Hermann Huefer and would later change it to Ford Madox 
Ford), T.S. Eliot, and William Carlos Williams, among others.167 It also 
published James Joyce, specifically chapters of Ulysses in progress, as fast 
 
 
 162. The Knoedler Case, supra note 155. 
 163. See infra text accompanying notes 233–53. 
 164. VANDERHAM, supra note 6, at 41; Bryer, supra note 6, at 155. 
 165. Bryer, supra note 6, at 149. Anderson’s autobiography does not give her birth date. The 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee library, which has some of her archives, says she was born on 
November 24, 1886. Univ. of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, Archives Dep’t, http://www.uwm.edu/Library/ 
arch/findaids/uwmmss12.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2007). 
 166. MARGARET ANDERSON, MY THIRTY YEARS’ WAR 142–46 (1930). Because Anderson’s 
rambling autobiography shows little interest in dates or years, it is necessary to read carefully to figure 
out approximately when an event occurred. These pages establish that Anderson and Heap published 
the magazine from New York from 1917 to 1923. The Little Review ceased publication in 1929. Id. at 
270. 
 167. These and other names appear in the table of contents of MARGARET ANDERSON, THE 
LITTLE REVIEW ANTHOLOGY 5–7 (1953). 
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as it could do so after Joyce sent them to Pound and Pound sent them to 
Anderson. Anderson wrote that on receiving the first chapter from Pound, 
the magazine’s European editor, she was moved to exclaim (it is not clear 
to whom, if to anyone): “This is the most beautiful thing we’ll ever have, I 
cried. We’ll print it if it’s the last effort of our lives.”168 The “we” refers to 
Anderson and Jane Heap, her partner in publishing and (for a time) in 
love. Serialization of Ulysses began with the March 1918 issue.169 It was 
not the “last effort” of Anderson’s and Heap’s lives either. They printed 
twenty-three more episodes through December 1920.170 Some of those 
chapters got them into trouble with the post office, which burned issues in 
which the Ulysses chapters appeared. But these problems were nothing 
you could not deal with if you were dedicated to great literature as you 
saw it, which Anderson and Heap certainly were. So they continued 
publishing and publishing more Joyce.  
B. The Little Review Gets Investigated 
What led Sumner to buy The Little Review? The July–August 1920 
number contained the final part of the “Nausicaa” episode of Ulysses.171 
Anderson and Heap, wishing to boost their circulation, had mailed copies 
to potential subscribers.172 Somehow, a copy was sent to a girl whose age 
is unknown except that she could read and understood enough of the Joyce 
excerpt to claim to be shocked, and perhaps she was. She showed it to her 
father, a prominent New York lawyer, who is also unidentified and who 
was shocked. He sent it to the Manhattan district attorney, Edward Swann, 
with a note.  
“Dear Sir,” it began: 
I enclose a copy under another cover—of a copy of ‘The Little 
Review’ which was sent to my daughter unsolicited. Please read the 
passages marked on pages 43, 45, 50 and 51. If such indecencies 
don’t come within the provisions of the Postal Laws then isn’t there 
some way in which the circulation of such things can be confined 
among the people who buy or subscribe to a publication of this 
kind? Surely there must be some way of keeping such ‘literature’ 
 
 
 168. ANDERSON, MY THIRTY YEARS’ WAR, supra note 166, at 175. 
 169. Id.; Bryer, supra note 6, at 150. 
 170. Bryer, supra note 6, at 149. 
 171. Id. at 155. 
 172. VANDERHAM, supra note 6, at 37. 
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out of the homes of people who don’t want it even if, in the interests 
of morality, there is no means of suppressing it.173 
Swann consulted Sumner, a lawyer himself.174 Sumner visited the 
Washington Square Bookshop, which Anderson and Heap were known to 
frequent and where, for a time, they had an office.175 He bought copies of 
the issue, read the “Nausicaa” episode, found it obscene, and filed a 
complaint against an owner of the bookstore at the Jefferson Market 
Courthouse a few blocks away. (The building now houses a public library 
where the public can borrow Ulysses.) Shortly thereafter, the owner was 
dropped from the case and Anderson and Heap were named defendants.176  
The portion of the Nausicaa episode that appeared in the July–August 
1920 issue of The Little Review runs about sixteen pages. It is headed 
“Episode XIII (Continued),” but for legal purposes it might as well have 
had no heading. It was impossible to argue that the episode had to be 
judged in the context of the book as a whole. The idea, commonplace 
today, that a piece of writing must be judged as a whole—that the entire 
work cannot be called obscene based solely on parts of it—was just 
beginning to take hold in the law.177 But in 1921, Ulysses was not yet a 
book. There was no whole. Or to put it another way, in the eyes of the law 
the excerpt in the July–August issue was the whole. On the other hand, 
Anderson and Heap may have been better off not having to defend the 
entire book. That would have required defense of the final chapter, the 
“Penelope” episode, which in great detail recounts the erotic thoughts of a 
 
 
 173. Id. at 37–38. Swann’s reaction was decidedly more aggressive than the lawyer’s sensible 
solution of simply insuring that distribution of the magazine be limited to those who wanted to read it.  
 174. Sumner graduated from New York University School of Law in 1904. Obituary, John S. 
Sumner, Foe of Vice, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1971, at 38. 
 175. John Quinn’s letters to Anderson in February 1921 are addressed to 27 West Eighth Street, 
the location of the bookstore. See, e.g., Letter from John Quinn to Miss Margaret C. Anderson (Feb. 5, 
1921) (original in collection of S. Ill. U., Carbondale). 
 176. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 277–78. Gorman reprints Sumner’s complaint of October 21, 
1920. Sumner had visited the bookstore on September 29, 1920 and had filed his first complaint on 
October 4, 1920. On October 21, he substituted Anderson and Heap for the owner of the bookstore. 
Bryer, supra note 6, at 157. 
 177. The New York Court of Appeals made this point, without citation to authority, in Halsey v. 
N.Y. Soc’y for the Suppression of Vice, 234 N.Y. 1, 4 (1922). The Court acknowledged that 
Mademoiselle de Maupin, at issue there, contained “many paragraphs . . . which taken by themselves 
are undoubtedly vulgar and indecent.” Id. But it went on to hold that  
[n]o work may be judged from a selection of such paragraphs alone. Printed by themselves 
they might, as a matter of law, come within the prohibition of the statute. So might a similar 
selection from Aristophanes or Chaucer or Boccaccio or even from the Bible. The book, 
however, must be considered broadly as a whole.  
Id. 
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half-asleep Molly Bloom and contains a fair number of four-letter words. 
“Penelope” was the episode that gave Morris Ernst his greatest challenge a 
dozen years later.178 “Nausicaa” is tame by comparison. 
What happens, then, in the last part of “Nausicaa” (as printed in The 
Little Review), and what happened in court? The novel Ulysses records not 
quite twenty-four hours in the life of thirty-eight-year-old Leopold Bloom 
of Dublin, beginning in the morning of June 16, 1904, and ending in the 
small hours of the following day. Bloom’s experiences that June day 
loosely follow those of Ulysses in Homer’s Odyssey. The “Nausicaa” 
episode finds Leopold Bloom on the beach at about 8:00 p.m. Twenty-
one-year-old Gerty MacDowell and two friends are nearby. Her friends 
leave to see fireworks a distance away. Gerty, out of sorts with her 
boyfriend, remains. She is aware and pleased that Bloom is watching her. 
Satirizing romance fiction, Joyce writes: 
She leaned back far to look up where the fireworks were and she 
caught her knee in her hands so as not to fall back looking up and 
there was no one to see only him and her when she revealed all her 
graceful beautifully shaped legs like that, supply soft and delicately 
rounded, and she seemed to hear the panting of his heart his hoarse 
breathing, because she knew about the passion of men like that 
. . . .179 
And so on. Gerty continues to lean back as Bloom watches. Bloom 
ejaculates in his pants. They never touch. But it was enough for Sumner, 
who filed his complaint. 
Now Anderson and Heap needed a lawyer. They went to John Quinn. 
Quinn was born poor in 1870 in Ohio. He went to Harvard Law School, 
came to New York, and achieved financial success before the era of the 
large law firm.180 Four decades after his death, though largely unknown 
except to some scholars of the period, Oxford University Press published a 
seven-hundred-page biography of Quinn.181 His place in the history does 
not, as with some lawyers, depend on his famous trials or cases, but rather 
on the fact that he associated with others—as benefactor, counselor, or 
 
 
 178. See supra note 45 and infra text accompanying notes 338–41.  
 179. James Joyce, Ulysses: Episode XIII (Continued), LITTLE REVIEW, July–Aug. 1920, at 42–43. 
Gerty’s age has been debated. We are told that she “would never see seventeen again.” JAMES JOYCE, 
ULYSSES 350 (Vintage ed. 1990). Later, Joyce writes that “she would be twenty-two in November,” 
but “she” could refer to Gerty’s friend Edy, mentioned in the same sentence. Id. at 352. There is no 
other clue.  
 180. REID, supra note 7. 
 181. Id. 
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friend—who were, or later became, famous. Evidence of Quinn’s 
supporting role appears in two 1923 photographs often found in histories 
and biographies of the era. Taken in Paris, the photographs show Joyce, 
Ezra Pound, Ford Madox Ford, and Quinn, three writers and a lawyer.182 
Of the four, Quinn, staring (not just looking) at the camera, has the most 
intense demeanor.  
Artists and writers were Quinn’s friends. He collected their works and 
contributed to their support. He helped The Little Review, too, in part by 
providing funds to pay Pound to be its European editor.183 Pound 
introduced Joyce’s work to Anderson and Heap.184 To say that Quinn did 
not much like Anderson and Heap is an understatement judging by his 
descriptions of them in letters to Pound. “[P]issing rabbits,” is one of his 
kinder characterizations.185 But Quinn was devoted to Joyce and helped 
support the magazine186 because of his love of modern European 
(especially Irish) literature. So it fell to Quinn to defend its editors. He did 
so because he believed, correctly it turned out, that if they were convicted, 
Joyce would not soon find a publisher for Ulysses in the United States. 
Quinn also believed that publishing Ulysses in installments was a bad idea. 
He had urged Joyce to stop sending chapters to Anderson and Heap—and 
had urged them to stop printing them.187 All to no avail. 
C. Anderson and Heap Get Prosecuted and Convicted 
The first court hearing on Sumner’s complaint, held October 21, 1920, 
went badly. Its purpose was to decide whether the case should be 
dismissed or go to trial. Quinn had so little faith in the possibility that the 
case would be dismissed at this early stage that he did not even plan to 
attend the hearing. As he wrote to Pound later that day: 
One of the young lawyers from my office, whom I had sent up to 
court to do the waiving, waiving everything but immunity, 
telephone[d] to me . . . and said that he thought we would have a 
good chance to get a dismissal. I had just come in from a big 
 
 
 182. One of the photographs is included in REID, supra note 7, at unnumbered page following 
238. The other appears in ELLMANN, supra note 7, at unnumbered page following page 482.  
 183. REID, supra note 7, at 285. 
 184. ANDERSON, MY THIRTY YEARS’ WAR, supra note 166, at 174–75. 
 185. Letter from John Quinn to Ezra Pound (Oct. 16, 1920) (original in collection of S. Ill. U., 
Carbondale). 
 186. REID, supra note 7 at 343. 
 187. Id. at 441, letter from John Quinn to James Joyce (Apr. 13, 1921), reprinted in 83 BULL OF 
RES. IN THE HUMAN 26, 34 (Spring 1980). 
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auction sale of 425 lots in the Bronx, belonging to a corporation that 
I represented, and was in the midst of dictating some urgent matters, 
when the before mentioned telephone message reached me, and I 
said and said and said to the aforementioned lawyer from my office 
that I would “Come right up”, “Come right up”, “come right up”, 
and the aforementioned lawyer said and said and said that he would 
have the case held until I came up; and I added: “Right up”, “Right 
up”, “Right up”. So I dropped the aforementioned dictation and 
went right up, right up, right up on the Sixty [Sixth] Avenue 
Elevated, and right down into the dingy court.188  
Quinn, politically connected, was a friend of the judge, Joseph 
Corrigan, and thought he was “one of the most liberal men on the 
bench.”189 We have no official record of the oral argument but we do have 
the subsequent Quinn correspondence, recollections of Anderson and 
Heap, and press reports. Quinn’s key argument tried to distinguish 
between filth and obscenity. “Nausicaa” might be filthy, he maintained, 
but not everything filthy is obscene. Here is Quinn’s description of his 
argument in a letter written the same day: 
I told who Joyce was, and what he had written and how serious an 
artist he was, and then got right down to the discussion of whether 
the July–August number was filthy in the meaning of the law. I 
defined “filthy” in literature and art, admitted that there was filth in 
literature and art, but that it was not filth that would corrupt, but 
rather that would brace and deter. Spoke of Swift and Rabelais’ 
filth. Contrasted the strong hard filth of a man like Joyce with the 
devotion to art of a fort flabby man like Wilde. Pointed out that it 
was beauty that corrupted, filth that deterred . . . . 
 Said that one should judge filthy not in the abstract, not in a 
flying machine ten thousand feet up in the blue sky, but by its effect 
upon the average man or woman, not its effect upon a degenerate on 
one side, or a convent bred saphead on the other. That there were 
 
 
 188. Letter from John Quinn to Ezra Pound (Oct. 21, 1920) (original in collection of S. Ill. U., 
Carbondale). This and other letters from Quinn reveal his wish to let Pound, Joyce, and others know 
that he was an important lawyer handling valuable matters for big clients, but was prepared to put the 
interests of his creative friends ahead of remunerative work. The letters also show Quinn’s efforts to 
attempt a writing style that he surely did not use with corporate clients. He was writing to artists and 
showing that he was also capable of playing with language (e.g., “right up”, “right up”, “right up”. . . 
and “right down into the dingy court”). 
 189. Id. 
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many things in life that were filthy, but not filthy as prohibited by 
the statute. That filthy in the statute was as filthy did. Not filthy in 
the abstract filthy in its result, pragmatically filthy, and not filthy in 
the absolute.  
 And then I tried to pin his Lordship Corrigan down on the 
syllogism that the average person reading the July–August number 
would either understand what it meant, or would not. If he 
understood what it meant, then it couldn’t corrupt him, for it would 
either amuse or bore him. If he didn’t understand what it meant, 
then it couldn’t corrupt him.190  
What Quinn apparently did not do was discuss the excerpt with any 
specificity. Perhaps Quinn chose not to be specific to make it easier, in 
light of the attendant publicity, for Judge Corrigan to dismiss the case. 
That would certainly be a plausible, and perhaps the best, strategy: ignore 
the elephant in the room. But Judge Corrigan saw only the elephant. After 
reading the excerpt he said, “‘[t]hat was the episode where the man 
[meaning Leopold Bloom] went off in his pants, which no one could 
misunderstand, and that I think is smutty, filthy within the meaning of the 
statute.’”191 And he put the case over for trial in the Court of Special 
Sessions.  
A quick trial is not what Quinn wanted. He wanted time. He attempted 
to have the case referred to the more congested Court of General 
Sessions.192 It would then take a year or more to go to trial, with the 
verdict decided by a jury, not a panel of judges.193 Quinn may have 
believed that a jury would be less able than three Special Sessions judges 
to untangle Joyce’s prose and understand what was happening in the 
episode. Quinn also hoped that Ulysses would be finished and published 
before there could even be a trial.194 This was a desperate strategy. Even if 
trial were delayed, and even if Joyce could timely finish the book, the 
prospect of a conviction, which Quinn still believed certain, would have 
made publication in the interval a risky venture. But Quinn seemed to 
think (or hope) otherwise. He told the Irish writer Shane Leslie that the 
reason he made “the motion for a jury trial was that it would postpone the 
 
 
 190. Id.  
 191. Id.  
 192. Letter from John Quinn to Shane Leslie (June 21, 1922) (original on file with the N.Y. Public 
Library). 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id.  
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trial of the case until after Ulysses could be published and sold and then 
the trial would be largely academic.”195 It was the strategy that turned out 
to be academic. The effort to send the case to the Court of General 
Sessions failed. Trial was set for February 14, 1921, before a panel of 
three judges.196  
Quinn was allowed to call at least two expert witnesses, John Cowper 
Powys, an author and lecturer, and Phillip Moeller of The Theater Guild. 
Scofield Thayer of The Dial was on hand to testify, too, but it appears that 
he did not do so because his testimony was deemed cumulative.197 
Anderson later wrote that the expert testimony went this way: 
Mr. Quinn calls literary “experts” to the stand to testify that Ulysses 
in their opinion would not corrupt our readers. The opinions of 
experts is regarded as quite unnecessary, since they know only 
about literature but not about law: Ulysses has suddenly become a 
matter of law rather than of literature—I grow confused again; but I 
am informed that the judges are being especially tolerant to admit 
witnesses at all—that such is not the custom in the special sessions 
court. . . . 
 Mr. John Cowper Powys testifies that Ulysses is too obscure and 
philosophical a work to be in any sense corrupting. (I wonder, as 
Mr. Powys takes the stand, whether his look and talk convey to the 
court that his mind is in the habit of functioning in regions where 
theirs could not penetrate: and I imagine the judges saying: “This 
man obviously knows much more about the matter than we do—the 
case is dismissed.” Of course I have no historical basis for 
expecting such a thing. I believe it has never happened . . . .) 
 Mr. Philip Moeller is the next witness to testify for The Little 
Review, and in attempting to answer the judges’ questions with 
intelligence he asks if he may use technical terminology. Permission 
 
 
 195. Id. at 5. Earlier, Quinn recognized the opposite, i.e., that a pending trial in General Sessions 
would also inhibit publication. Letter from John Quinn to Ezra Pound (Oct. 16, 1920) (original in 
collection of S. Ill. U., Carbondale). 
 196. The trial began on February 14, then adjourned for a week, with oral arguments on February 
21. Improper Novel Costs Women $100, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1921, at 12. The trial was before Judges 
Kernochan, McInerney, and Moss. Court Puzzled by Experts on Book’s Morals, N.Y. TRIB., Feb. 15, 
1921, at 5. 
 197. This is what Anderson recalled shortly after the trial, Margaret Anderson, “Ulysses” in 
Court, in LITTLE REVIEW ANTHOLOGY 307 (1953), though much later she recalled that Thayer did 
testify. ANDERSON, MY THIRTY YEARS’ WAR, supra note 166, at 220. The New York Tribune reported 
that only Powys, who it said was “internationally known as a lecturer on literature, and Philip Moeller, 
the playwright and also president of the Theater Guild,” testified. Court Puzzled, supra note 196. 
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being given he explains quite simply that the objectionable chapter 
is an unveiling of the subconscious mind, in the Freudian manner, 
and that he saw no possibility of these revelations being aphrodisiac 
in their influence. The court gasps, and one of the judges calls out, 
“Here, here, you might as well talk Russian. Speak plain English if 
you want us to understand what you’re saying.” Then they ask Mr. 
Moeller what he thinks would be the effect of the objectionable 
chapter in the mind of the average reader. Mr. Moeller answers: “I 
think it would mystify him.” “Yes, but what would be the effect?” (I 
seem to be drifting into unconsciousness. Question—What is the 
effect of that which mystifies? Answer—Mystification. But no one 
looks either dazed or humourous, so I decide that they regard the 
proceedings as perfectly sensible.)198  
Press reports add to Anderson’s description. When Moeller said that 
Joyce employed the “Freudian method of psychoanalysis” in Ulysses and 
added that the book “most emphatically was not aphrodisiac,” Justice 
Kernochan called a halt. 
“What’s this!” he exploded. “What’s that?” 
 Mr. Quinn rushed forward with an explanation. “Well, if I may 
explain to your honor,” he said, “aphrodisiac is an adjective derived 
from the noun Aphrodite, supposed to be the goddess of beauty or 
love”— 
 “I understand that,” broke in Justice Kernochan, “but I don’t 
understand what this man is talking about. He might as well be 
talking in Russian.”199  
The decision to call experts, and the fact that they were allowed, is 
noteworthy for two reasons. First, the Court of Appeals had expressly 
ruled against experts in 1884 in the Muller case, which was still good 
law.200 Nonetheless, nearly four decades had passed and it was apparent 
 
 
 198. Anderson, “Ulysses” in Court, supra note 197, at 306–07. The press reported that Powys’s 
testimony “proceeded smoothly.” Powys testified that  
in his opinion Joyce’s style was too “obscure” to “deprave and corrupt the public,” comparing 
it to a cubist painting in the sense that the latter was a departure from the orthodox methods of 
painting. He said further that because of the unusual style of combining narrative with 
dialogue the public would be “repelled” rather than attracted to Ulysses. 
Court Puzzled, supra note 196. 
 199. Court Puzzled, supra note 196. 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 118–19. 
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that attitudes were shifting. Courts themselves cited expert opinions.201 
Second, on February 5, 1921, Quinn had written to Anderson and Heap to 
tell them he would not call experts. He explained that “[c]onviction is 
absolutely certain” and “the Appellate Court will with absolute certainty 
affirm the decision of the lower court.”202 Further, printing costs for an 
appeal would be prohibitive. His clients were welcome to consult separate 
counsel if they wished and he, Quinn, would be “glad to turn over to him 
the entire matter.”203 But then on February 8, Quinn again wrote Anderson. 
This time he urged her to “have in court ready to testify at least two 
character witnesses who can testify as to the history of The Little Review 
and your objects and motives and purposes in publishing it, and as to your 
general reputation and standing in the literary world.”204 Quinn’s reason 
was not to avoid a conviction, which he still deemed “certain,” but to 
avoid a jail sentence. Then Quinn added a second request, for Anderson’s 
suggestions of “at least two witnesses” who could testify to Joyce’s 
“standing as a writer” and the “tendency” of the excerpt Anderson 
published, by which he must have meant the tendency to deprave and 
corrupt, which is the Muller/Hicklin test for obscenity.205 But even here, 
the purpose of the experts would only be “in mitigation of sentence.”206 
Quinn ended the letter by saying that he would not be able to see 
Anderson and Heap “until Friday afternoon.”207 That would be February 
11. The trial was to begin the following Monday. We can conclude that 
Quinn did not consult with and prepare the experts beforehand. Judging 
from his instruction to Anderson to have the experts “in court ready to 
testify,” he did not expect to meet them until Monday.  
Quinn reworked his argument from what it had been at the October 
hearing. No longer did he emphasize distinctions in types of filth. He fell 
back on his secondary argument: The work was so obscure, no one could 
possibly understand it. Not even Quinn himself understood it. If no one 
could understand it, no one could be corrupted. As he explained to Joyce 
in a letter several months later: 
 
 
 201. See supra note 122.  
 202. Letter from John Quinn to Miss Margaret C. Anderson, at 16 (Feb. 5, 1921) (original in 
collection of S. Ill. U., Carbondale). 
 203. Id. at 17. 
 204. Letter from John Quinn to Miss Margaret C. Anderson, at 1 (Feb. 8, 1921) (original in 
collection of S. Ill. U., Carbondale). 
 205. Id. For the test, see supra text accompanying note 63. 
 206. Letter from John Quinn to Miss Margaret C. Anderson, supra note 204, at 2. 
 207. Id. 
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I took the only tack that could be taken with the three stupid judges, 
and that was that no one could understand what the thing was about. 
I nearly got away with it. I got two of them to admit that they could 
not understand it. After the witnesses were examined they said they 
wanted to read the magazine. So there was an adjournment of a 
week to February 21st. I knew that two of the judges were more 
interested in eating and smoking and perhaps drinking and poker-
playing probably or church-going, or maybe all, than they were in 
reading The Little Review, and that there was no chance that they 
would read it in the meantime. But the third judge was one of these 
nervous asses. He reminded me for all the world of one of these 
restless hyenas that move up and down and backwards and forwards 
in a cage. He is an ass without the slightest glimmer of culture, but 
he knows the meaning of words. I made what many people in court 
called a brilliant argument, and my assistant, Mr. Watson, felt when 
we got through that the case was won, for two of the judges had 
agreed with me that they could not understand it. I made the 
analogy of Cubist painting and so on.208  
A year later, recounting the trial to Shane Leslie, Quinn expanded on 
what he called his “cubistic painting” argument: “I likened Ulysses to 
cubistic painting, experimental, tentative, revolutionary, if you like, but 
certainly not depraving or corrupting. I said: ‘some men like and even buy 
cubistic painting. But that does not mean that it corrupts them or drives 
them to whore houses.’”209  
Press reports offer a little more detail. According to the New York 
Tribune, Quinn 
hinted that the readers of The Little Review knew how to protect 
their morals and said that the average men and women were safe 
from danger, because if they read the magazine, which was 
improbable, they would be either unable to comprehend Joyce’s 
style, or would be bored and disgusted.210  
Quinn acknowledged that “certain passages of the chapter were 
disgusting, but insisted that ‘it is no crime to be disgusting.’”211 
 
 
 208. Letter from John Quinn to James Joyce (Apr. 13, 1921), reprinted in 83 BULL. OF RES. IN 
THE HUMAN. 26, 35 (Spring 1980). 
 209. Letter from John Quinn to Shane Leslie, at 5 (June 21, 1922) (original on file with the N.Y. 
Public Library). 
 210. Ulysses Adjudged Indecent; Review Editors Are Fined, N.Y. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1921, at 13. 
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Although Quinn may have believed that he had no choice but to argue 
as he did, the argument had several holes. First of all, a 
nonrepresentational painting, “cubistic” or otherwise, does not generally 
depict a sex act, at least not a discernible one. Nor does it have a narrative 
in the usual sense. Second, the “nobody can understand it so it can’t 
corrupt” argument had capsized before Judge Corrigan, who easily 
concluded, without need for explanation from opposing counsel, that “the 
man went off in his pants, which no one could misunderstand.”212 The 
chance of obscuring that part of the story was even more remote at the trial 
itself, where a prosecutor would be (and in fact was) ready to read aloud 
and argue the meaning of the language. So perhaps Quinn would have 
been better advised directly to confront what his argument necessarily 
ignored, namely what happened between Leopold Bloom and Gerty 
MacDowell on the Dublin beach at 8:00 p.m. on June 16, 1904. With a 
view to an appeal (were he willing to consider an appeal), Quinn might 
have tried to distinguish between pictures, at issue in Muller, and prose, 
stressing that the former, because visually explicit and leaving little to the 
imagination, posed greater dangers to morality. Would the strategy have 
been successful? We cannot know, but it was not emphasized.  
Trial resumed on February 21. As Bryer reports, 
 Joseph Forrester, the prosecutor announced that he was going to 
read the offensive passages aloud. At this, one of the judges, 
regarding the beautiful and innocent-looking Miss Anderson with a 
protective paternity, refused to permit the obscenity to be read in 
her presence. When Quinn smilingly informed him that she was the 
editor, the justice replied that he was sure she hadn’t known the 
significance of what she was publishing.213  
Quinn, in his April letter to Joyce, described the ensuing events: 
[Forrester] denounced the book so vehemently that I thought he 
would have an apoplectic fit. I made one good point in reply: 
pointing to Forrester, purple and puffing, his face distorted with 
rage, I said: “There is my best exhibit. There is proof that Ulysses 
does not corrupt or fill people full of lascivious thoughts. Look at 
him! He is mad all over. He wants to hit somebody. He doesn’t 
want to love anybody. He wants somebody to be punished. He’s 
mad. He’s angry. His face is distorted with anger, not with love. 
 
 
 212. See supra text accompanying notes 190–91. 
 213. Bryer, supra note 6, at 161. 
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That’s what Joyce does. That’s what Ulysses does. It makes people 
angry. They want to break something. They want somebody to be 
convicted. They feel like prosecuting everybody connected with it, 
even if they don’t know how to pronounce the name Ulysses. But it 
doesn’t tend to drive them to the arms of some siren. And after all it 
isn’t a crime to make people angry.”214  
Quinn’s strategy did not work. Justice McInerney said, “I think that 
this novel is unintelligent, and it seems to me like the work of a disordered 
mind.”215 Anderson and Heap were convicted. Punishment was a $50 fine 
for each defendant, which they did not have. A benefactor paid it.216 
Anderson later regretted that she had not chosen jail instead.217 The Little 
Review published what would be its final Ulysses excerpt in the 
November–December 1920 issue. 
Neither client thought much of the defense (or what the law recognized 
as a defense) because neither thought that art could be judged by legal or 
moral standards. Joyce wrote “art” and that should have been the end of it, 
so far as they were concerned. Or, as Heap later put it in The Little Review 
(recalling Joyce’s description of Gerty leaning back): “Girls lean back 
everywhere.”218 And in reply to the charge that “Nausicaa” would corrupt 
the minds of young girls, Heap wrote: “So the mind of the young girl rules 
this country? . . . If there is anything I really fear it is the mind of the 
young girl.”219 She concluded that “the only question relevant at all to 
Ulysses is—Is it a work of Art?”220 One of the story’s sweet ironies is that 
decades later, when the United States Supreme Court fashioned a test for 
deciding whether writing, allegedly obscene, was protected by the First 
Amendment, it asked Heap’s question—is it art? But being a court, it 
needed many more words to ask it.221 
 
 
 214. Letter from John Quinn to James Joyce (Apr. 13, 1921), reprinted in 83 BULL. OF RES. IN 
THE HUMAN. 26, 35 (Spring 1980). 
 215. Greenwich Village’s Editoresses Fined, N.Y. HERALD, Feb. 22, 1921, at 8. 
 216. ANDERSON, MY THIRTY YEARS’ WAR, supra note 166, at 221. 
 217. Id. at 226. 
 218. Jane Heap, Art and the Law, in ANDERSON, LITTLE REVIEW ANTHOLOGY, supra note 167, at 
302. 
 219. Id.  
 220. Id. at 303. 
 221. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (implying that a work had to be “utterly 
without redeeming social importance” to lack First Amendment protection as obscenity); A Book 
Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 419 
(1966) (plurality of three justices states that “[a] book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be 
utterly without redeeming social value”); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Miller denied 
First Amendment protection to a work that “taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
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Anderson regretted that Quinn had not been more forceful about 
stressing Joyce’s reputation despite the court’s lack of interest:  
John Quinn’s idea was for Jane and me to remain inconspicuous, 
meek and silent, and to surround ourselves with “window 
trimmings”—meaning a group of conservative quietly-dressed 
women and innocent boarding-school girls. We felt that he was 
wrong in not wanting us to speak. I still believe we could have 
given a clearer idea of Joyce’s motives than he succeeded in doing. 
He was brilliant in defining Joyce’s prestige in the world of letters, 
in exploiting his own prestige in the legal world, and in scoring 
government officials whose ignorance didn’t permit them to 
distinguish between literature and pornography. But he didn’t stress 
the quality of Joyce’s mind or the psychology which explains 
Rabelaisian tendencies. When one of the judges protested that he 
wasn’t interested in hearing anything about James Joyce, that he 
merely wanted to discuss the obscene writing in question, John 
Quinn let his opportunity slip entirely—without even seeing it, I 
believe. I nearly rose from my seat to cry out that the only issue 
under consideration was the kind of person James Joyce was, that 
the determining factor in aesthetic and moral judgment was always 
the personal element, that obscenity per se doesn’t exist. But, 
having promised, I sat still.222  
Anderson is on to something here. It would have been easier for the 
court to have acquitted if the judges were aware of Joyce’s status and the 
reasons for it. It would have taken some courage for the judges to 
conclude that the beach episode was not obscene. Judges are not immune 
to popular opinion. Greater emphasis on Joyce’s prominence might have 
given them the armor they needed or wanted to repel public criticism of a 
decision to dismiss the case. Of course, this assumes that it would have 
been possible to make this proof; yet, as Anderson herself wrote shortly 
after the trial, the judges showed no interest in Quinn’s effort to tell “who 
James Joyce is” and viewed their job as solely to decide whether “certain 
passages of Ulysses (incidentally the only passages they can understand) 
violate the statute.”223 But Quinn could have tried to galvanize 
 
 
“has never commanded the adherence of more than three Justices at one time.” Id. at 25. 
 222. ANDERSON, MY THIRTY YEARS’ WAR, supra note 166, at 219–20. 
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“respectable” public opinion extra-judicially.224 It had worked for Alfred 
Knoedler.225  
After the convictions, as he had predicted, Quinn was unable to interest 
publishers in the book. Quinn died in 1924. Ulysses would not be 
published in the United States until 1934. Meanwhile, in Paris, Sylvia 
Beach published Ulysses under the imprint of her bookstore, Shakespeare 
and Company. Maurice Darantiere, the Dijon printer of the book, sent her 
the first two volumes by overnight rail. Beach was at the Paris station at 
7:00 a.m. to receive them. It was February 2, 1922, Joyce’s fortieth 
birthday. She delivered one copy to Joyce and placed the second in her 
shop window.226 Ulysses was published.  
As he promised, Quinn did not appeal Anderson’s and Heap’s 
convictions. They had no money to hire new counsel, of course, or print a 
record. Quinn represented them without fee and not for any love of them. 
He thought they were taking advantage of Joyce for their own celebrity.227 
Yet Quinn also understood that the conviction, if left undisturbed, would 
likely prevent publication of Ulysses in the United States for some time 
notwithstanding that the verdict represented the views of only three men—
not a jury and not an appellate court. We can never know why, despite 
Quinn’s devotion to Joyce and literature, the same devotion that led him to 
defend The Little Review in the first place and to support Joyce and it 
financially, he summarily rejected the possibility of an appeal, even at his 
own expense. 
On the other hand, Quinn’s decision not to appeal can also be seen to 
have a strategic purpose. He had assumed before trial that conviction was 
inevitable and that an appellate court would inevitably affirm. The first 
prediction came true. An appellate decision affirming the conviction 
would likely be accompanied by an opinion whose harsh language could 
eliminate whatever slim chance remained for publication of the book once 
finished. In other words, a bold publisher just might be willing to go 
forward in the face of a lower court conviction of Anderson and Heap for 
publishing one part of one chapter. But an appellate court’s condemnation 
of that chapter might scare off even the most fearless publishers. We must 
remember that not only money was at risk. John Sumner was still out there 
 
 
 224. See infra text accompanying notes 333–36. 
 225. See supra text accompanying notes 147–49.  
 226. ELLMANN, supra note 7, at 524. 
 227. Quinn believed that Anderson and Heap were using Ulysses to gain fame for themselves 
while paying Joyce nothing and sacrificing Joyce’s chances to publish the book in the United States. 
Letter from John Quinn to Ezra Pound (Oct. 16, 1920) (original in collection of S. Ill. U., Carbondale). 
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and was sure to bring criminal charges against any publisher of Ulysses. 
(A decade later he actively supported the decision to prevent importation 
of the book into the country.)228 We know that Quinn did try to persuade 
Ben Huebsch and others to take on Ulysses following the Anderson and 
Heap convictions, to no avail.229 Ten years later, Huebsch again passed on 
the opportunity.230 It took the upstart Bennett Cerf and his new company, 
Random House, to do what established publishers would not do as late as 
1932. 
D. Could Quinn Have Won an Appeal?  
We can never know what the outcome of an appeal to the highest New 
York court might have been.231 Yet for good reasons we can surmise that 
chances for reversal were at least fair, certainly better than Quinn believed. 
A different strategist might have made the attempt once it was clear that a 
conviction, left standing, would scare off all publishers. But who should 
choose the strategy? Here, another complexity enters the equation. 
Anderson and Heap were convicted, not Joyce. They alone had the right to 
appeal. Yet their appeal, if unsuccessful, would affect Joyce more than 
anyone. Harsh appellate language aside, Anderson and Heap would lose 
nothing from a decision affirming the convictions. And they would gain 
nothing from a reversal of their convictions but a clean criminal record, 
which did not seem to concern them.232 It was Joyce who stood the most to 
lose or gain. Yet it was not his decision. So far as we know, the question 
of appeal never arose after trial, either with Joyce or the defendants. It is 
worth asking whether an appeal might have succeeded. To do so, we need 
to examine other obscenity prosecutions shortly before and after the trial 
of Anderson and Heap. 
 
 
 228. See infra text accompanying notes 419–21. 
 229. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 279–81. 
 230. He gave as a reason the inability to obtain the rights from Sylvia Beach. See THE UNITED 
STATES V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE 100 (Michael Moscato & Leslie Le Blanc 
eds., 1984). 
 231. Any appeal would have to be taken to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and then 
as of right to New York Court of Appeals. People v. Robinson, 143 N.E. 745 (N.Y. 1924); People v. 
Ekerold, 105 N.E. 670 (N.Y. 1914). See also People v. Johnston, 79 N.E. 1018 (N.Y. 1907); People ex 
rel. Comm’rs of Pub. Charities and Corrections v. Cullen, 45 N.Y. 401 (N.Y. 1896). 
 232. The possibility that The Little Review could resume publishing Ulysses following reversal 
must be counted as remote. By the time the case moved through the appellate courts, the book would 
be finished or nearly so. Further, an appellate finding that the “Nausicca” episode was not obscene 
would provide no immunity against prosecution for publication of other excerpts from the work in 
progress. 
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The tide was turning against John Sumner and the Society for the 
Suppression of Vice toward and after the end of the First World War. 
They lost several important prosecutions in this period. One loss was the 
1918 acquittal—before the same court that later tried Anderson and 
Heap—of Raymond Halsey, a bookstore clerk, for selling Sumner a copy 
of Theopile Gautier’s Mademoiselle de Maupin, first published in France 
in 1835 and in the United States in 1917.233 The book was sexually 
transgressive for its time and for much time thereafter, far more so than the 
Ulysses excerpt Quinn defended. Following his acquittal, Halsey sued the 
Society for malicious prosecution and in 1919 won $2,500 from a jury, 
which concluded that Sumner did not even have so much as probable 
cause to prosecute the book as obscene.234 This was quite a remarkable 
conclusion given the book’s content. The appellate division upheld 
Halsey’s award in 1920235 and the Society appealed. In his brief to the 
Court of Appeals, counsel for the Society described the book in some 
detail in order to impress on the judges just how salacious were its themes 
and, therefore, the reasonableness of the prosecution. For example, he 
wrote: 
Beginning with Chapter III, our hero describes his amours with the 
fair Rosette, running through Chapters III, IV & V. The whole 
description reeks with lasciviousness. It is a vivid appeal to lewd 
passions. There is hardly a reference to woman in any page, in 
which she is considered in any other light than as a desirable or 
undesirable mistress. Virtue in a woman is apparently 
inconceivable. Her value depends upon her physical charms and her 
complaisance. All through the book runs a cynical contempt for all 
that we consider clean, decent and virtuous. Some of his 
experiences with Rosette are portrayed in language which if printed 
in a public paper would lead to instant denunciation. . . .  
 Beginning with Chapter VI, the writer introduces a new 
character. “Rosalind,” masquerading in man’s attire as the 
 
 
 233. Halsey v. N.Y. Soc’y for the Suppression of Vice, 136 N.E. 219 (N.Y. 1922); BOYER, supra 
note 40, at 61. 
 234. Halsey, 136 N.E. at 219. 
 235. Halsey v. N.Y. Soc’y for the Suppression of Vice, 185 N.Y.S. 931 (App. Div. 1920). 
Actually the case has a somewhat more tangled history. Following the first malicious prosecution 
verdict for Halsey, the appellate division reversed because the trial judge had instructed the jury that 
probable cause was lacking as a matter of law. Halsey v. N.Y. Soc’y for the Supression of Vice, 180 
N.Y.S. 836, 838 (App. Div. 1920). This was a jury question. Id. On remand, Halsey won again and his 
victory was affirmed on two appeals. Id.  
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Chavalier Theodore de Serannes, succeeds in inflaming Rossette’s 
passions and a large part is given to Rosette’s vain efforts in trying 
to bring “Theodore” as a lover to the crucial point, and her inability 
to repay Rosette’s love in the one way desired, ending in a duel with 
Rosette’s brother Alcibiades. She nearly gets herself into difficulties 
at a tavern. The balance of the book is devoted largely to Roselind’s 
adventures, her hopes of securing a desirable lover. She finally is 
discovered by D’Albert and yields herself to him. The latter half of 
the book is devoted to the amours of D’Albert with Rosette and 
Roselind. The enormous prolixity of the author makes it difficult to 
attempt a complete analysis of that pastime, without taking more 
space than would be justifiable in a brief. The author seemed to be 
so enamoured with lewdness that he cannot tear himself away from 
it, but lingers over every detail, especially the more suggestive of 
his descriptions, taking pages to describe the amourous raptures of 
the principal actors. . . . 
 The book is really a novel, written for the sole apparent object of 
describing the successful amours of a French gentleman of fashion. 
It describes all women as wanton, all men of fashion, at best, as 
libertines. . . .236 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, citing expert opinion.237 This is the 
same court that nearly forty years earlier, in Muller, refused to allow the 
defendant to introduce the testimony of experts on the issue of obscenity. 
But of course it was a different court. The majority opinion cited Henry 
James, Arthur Symons, George Saintsbury, James Perkins, and at some 
length, Benjamin Wells. All were writers or students of literature and all 
quotes are from books or articles dating back more than fifty years.238 The 
Second Circuit would later cite Halsey in affirming Judge Woolsey’s 
finding that Ulysses was not obscene.239  
Another loss to the Society, in September 1922, was a judge’s 
dismissal of a complaint against publisher Horace Liveright. The book that 
 
 
 236. Brief of Appellant at 10–13, Halsey v. New York Soc’y for the Suppression of Vice, 136 
N.E. 219 (N.Y. 1922) (inconsistency in the spelling of names is not corrected). 
 237. Halsey, 136 N.E. 220–21. 
 238. “We may take judicial notice that [the book] has been widely sold, separately and as a part of 
every collection of the works of Gautier. It has excited admiration as well as opposition.” Id. at 220. 
Halsey’s brief to the Court of Appeals does not cite this critical history, which the court appears to 
have discovered on its own. 
 239. United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936). 
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got Liveright into trouble was a translation of Petronius’s Satyricon.240 
And in the same month, another judge dismissed a Sumner complaint 
against publisher Thomas Seltzer, who like Liveright was willing to push 
the boundaries of what traditional publishers recognized as “good taste.” 
Seltzer published D.H. Lawrence’s Women in Love, Arthur Schnitzler’s 
Casanova’s Homecoming, and A Young Girl’s Diary with a preface by 
Sigmund Freud.241 It is true that Liveright’s and Seltzer’s victories against 
the Society came more than a year after the Anderson and Heap 
convictions, but they show that courts at the time were moving steadily 
away from Hicklin and Muller. The Court of Appeals, in upholding the 
jury’s finding of no probable cause in the Halsey case in 1922 (despite the 
book’s theme and explicitness), did not even cite Muller and Hicklin, 
although the dissent did.242 Further, before Anderson and Heap’s trial, 
lower courts had several times ruled against the Society in Halsey’s 
malicious prosecution case.243 
There are more cases. In the summer before Anderson and Heap were 
arrested, the appellate division in Manhattan reversed a jury conviction of 
Harper & Brothers and its president, Clinton Brainard, for selling 
Madeleine, an anonymous autobiography of a prostitute and madam.244 
The court could “see no useful purpose in the publication of the book” and 
could not “agree that it has any moral lesson to teach,” but it could not say 
that the book “contains a single word or picture which tends to excite 
lustful or lecherous desire.”245 Again, the majority opinion did not cite 
Muller or Hicklin, although the dissent did.246 Sumner also caused the 
prosecution of Jurgen, by James Branch Cabell, a book seemingly 
innocent but allegedly replete with double entendres and “phallic hints and 
references.”247 Quinn initially represented the publisher and managed to 
have the case transferred to the Court of General Sessions, exactly the 
strategy he would later unsuccessfully attempt for The Little Review. 
Although the police raid leading to the prosecution of Jurgen occurred in 
January 1920, the trial was not held until October 1922, when a new 
lawyer succeeded in having it dismissed.248  
 
 
 240. BOYER, supra note 40, at 82–83. 
 241. Id. at 78–81. 
 242. Halsey, 136 N.E. at 222 (Crane, J., dissenting). 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 234–37. 
 244. People v. Brainard, 183 N.Y.S. 452 (App. Div. 1920). 
 245. Id. at 456. 
 246. Id. at 457 (Dowling, J., dissenting). 
 247. BOYER, supra note 40, at 75. 
 248. Id. at 78. 
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Another decision that would have been useful to Anderson and Heap 
on appeal was United States v. Kennerley.249 Citing Bennett, Learned 
Hand, then on the district court, reluctantly refused to dismiss an 
indictment for sending an obscene book through the mail, but criticized 
the state of the law: 
I hope it is not improper for me to say that the rule as laid down, 
however consonant it may be with mid-Victorian morals, does not 
seem to me to answer to the understanding and morality of the 
present time, as conveyed by the words, “obscene, lewd, or 
lascivious.” I question whether in the end men will regard that as 
obscene which is honestly relevant to the adequate expression of 
innocent ideas, and whether they will not believe that truth and 
beauty are too precious to society at large to be mutilated in the 
interests of those most likely to pervert them to base uses.250  
Hand later served on the panel that affirmed Judge Woolsey and whose 
opinion embraced the “honestly relevant” test he floated here. Kennerley 
was acquitted at trial. His lawyer was John Quinn. 
Why were these prosecutions unsuccessful? First, like Fielding’s Tom 
Jones, which a New York court found not obscene in 1894 in In re 
Worthington,251 Mademoiselle de Maupin enjoyed present and historical 
critical support, as did Rabelais, Ovid, Boccaccio, and Voltaire, each of 
whose works had also escaped censorship in New York in recent years.252 
Second, publisher Selzer mounted an aggressive defense, including 
impressive expert witnesses and a public relations campaign.253 Although 
Quinn called expert witnesses at the trial of Anderson and Heap, he did so 
at the last minute, apparently with no preparation, and solely in order to 
reduce the risk of jail following conviction. He may have viewed 
publicity, or any effort to woo what we today call the media, as contrary to 
his professional role. He even lamented Anderson and Heap’s decision to 
bring supporters to the courtroom.254 Otto Kahn, who helped support The 
Little Review financially, told Anderson after the verdict, “John Quinn is 
 
 
 249. 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).  
 250. Id. at 120–21. 
 251. 30 N.Y.S. 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1894). 
 252. Id. (deciding not to destroy Arabian Nights, the works of Rabelais, and Ovid’s Art of Love for 
violating obscenity law); St. Hubert Guild v. Quinn, 118 N.Y.S. 582 (App. Div. 1909) (Voltaire); 
BOYER, supra note 40, at 82–83.  
 253. BOYER, supra note 40, at 80. 
 254. Bryer, supra note 6, at 160. 
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rather old fashioned, I’m afraid. I should have given you Morris Gest255 as 
a publicity agent and had the case on all the front pages.”256 Publicity 
could have stressed Joyce’s international reputation. Quinn did try to raise 
Joyce’s stature at trial and was rebuffed. A less “old fashioned” lawyer 
could have sought to achieve the same goal extra-judicially, which might 
have made the press more sympathetic and had an influence on appellate 
courts or even the trial judges. Anderson and Heap had much press 
coverage but no press support.257 The New York Times said that the book 
was so obscure—of interest especially to “psychopathologists”—that it 
was not worth banning.258 Quinn’s passivity in this regard is exactly 
opposite to Morris Ernst’s prodigious cultivation of respectable opinion 
nationwide a decade later—support that made it easier for the federal 
judges hearing his case to free Ulysses without fear that they would be 
crossing clear boundaries of social acceptability. Of course, none of this 
means an appeal would have succeeded. Working against Quinn was the 
fact that Joyce was relatively new, without the armor that long historical 
endorsement can confer. Also, Quinn had only part of a chapter to defend, 
not the entire book. In that part, a young woman leans back to reveal parts 
of her body to an older man, who is watching from nearby and who 
ejaculates in his pants while watching the woman exhibit herself. Perhaps 
most challenging to a defense lawyer is the implication that the woman is 
aware of and pleased by the man’s conduct. Could that scene have made it 
past a New York court in 1921 or 1922?  
Yes. With the advantage of the Brainard and Halsey cases, a lawyer in 
Quinn’s position should have realized in 1921 that the New York courts 
were divided on how broadly to utilize their power to suppress works of 
art through conviction of authors and publishers. Quinn’s certainty that the 
convictions would be affirmed is not defensible. Quinn might have lost, 
but he also might have won. The unsuccessful prosecutions of Liveright 
and Seltzer and other events in the ensuing decade confirm the 
diminishing power of the opponents of “vice” and the increasing 
unwillingness of judges to be the censors of art or books, at least not 
 
 
 255. Morris Gest was a successful Broadway producer. See 400 at Funeral of Morris Gest, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 19, 1942, at 20 (“More than 400 persons, many of whom are prominent in the theatre, 
were present.”).  
 256. BOYER, supra note 40, at 85. 
 257. See ANDERSON, MY THIRTY YEARS’ WAR, supra note 166, at 226 (“During the trial and 
afterward not one New York newspaper came to our defense, not one spoke out for Joyce, not one 
cared to be identified with the Ulysses scandal.”). 
 258. Taste, Not Morals, Vindicated, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1921, at 12. 
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where enlightened public opinion had come to the defense.259 The New 
York Society won some of its cases, and it scared some publishers from 
even offering certain books,260 but in the following decade, appellate 
victories where the work and its author had a respectable following often 
eluded the Society. One Society victory in this period was over Arthur 
Schnitzler’s play “Reigin” (or “La Ronde”). In 1930, the appellate division 
divided 3–2 in affirming the conviction of Philip Pesky, a bookstore clerk, 
for selling the play.261 Like Anderson and Heap, Pesky had been convicted 
before a panel of three judges in the court of special sessions (with one 
judge dissenting).262 Underscoring the stark division in the New York case 
law on book censorship at the time, the majority cited Bennett and Muller 
and the dissent cited Brainard and Worthington.263 The New York Court 
of Appeals affirmed later that year, over two dissents.264 The majority 
emphasized the deference due the trier of fact and refused to find that the 
“the writing is so innocuous as to forbid the submission of its quality to 
the triers of the facts.”265 
Yet less than two years after this decision, the same court (4–3) 
reversed convictions, affirmed by the appellate division, for producing the 
play “Frankie and Johnnie.”266 The majority cited Muller passingly, 
ignoring its broader language. It wrote that the question was not “whether 
[the play] would tend to coarsen or vulgarize the youth who might witness 
it but whether it would tend to lower their standards of right and wrong, 
specifically as to the sexual relation.”267 And it continued in a vein that 
clearly showed receptivity to greater license in theatrical works and 
therefore books:  
Perhaps in an age of innocence the facts of life should be withheld 
from the young but a theatre goer could not give his approval to the 
 
 
 259. See BOYER, supra note 40, at 95. Boyer concludes that by 1922 Sumner “believed firmly that 
‘the chance of being convicted’ was ‘the chief deterrent against a flood of still more vicious books,’ 
yet clearly the credibility of this deterrent would soon vanish if the pattern of acquittals continued.” Id. 
at 97. 
 260. Id. at 135 (describing how Knopf would back down to avoid action by Sumner). 
 261. People v. Pesky, 243 N.Y.S. 193, 198 (App. Div. 1930). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 196–97, 199. 
 264. People v. Pesky, 193 N.E. 227 (N.Y. 1930). 
 265. Id. Pro-censorship forces did have other victories in New York courts in the ensuing decades. 
Perhaps most noteworthy is the prosecution of Doubleday & Company for publishing Edmund 
Wilson’s book Memoirs of Hecate County. People v. Doubleday & Co., 77 N.E.2d 6, 7 (N.Y. 1947), 
aff’d by an equally divided court, 335 U.S. 848 (1948). 
 266. People v. Wendling, 180 N.E. 169 (N.Y. 1932). 
 267. Id. at 169–70. 
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modern stage as “spokesman of the thought and sentiment” of 
Broadway and at the same time silence this rough and profane 
representation of scenes which repel rather than seduce. 
 The production of such a play may be repulsive to puritanical 
ideas of propriety as would “Camille” and may be offensive to the 
more liberal minded as lacking in taste and refinement, as would the 
morally unobjectionable “Abie’s Irish Rose.” The play may be 
gross and its characters wanting in moral sense. It may depict 
women who carry on a vicious trade and their male associates. It 
cannot be said to suggest, except “to a prurient imagination,” 
unchaste or lustful ideas. It does not counsel or invite to vice or 
voluptuousness. It does not deride virtue. Unless we say that it is 
obscene to use the language of the street rather than that of the 
scholar, the play is not obscene under the Penal Law, although it 
might be so styled by the censorious.268  
This decision is especially noteworthy because the statute under which 
the defendants were convicted (unlike the statute in the prosecution of 
Anderson and Heap) specifically targeted plays that “tend to the corruption 
of the morals of youth or others.”269 
In 1929, a magistrate ordered that a complaint be filed against the 
publisher of “The Well of Loneliness,” which the court described as “a 
novel dealing with the childhood and early womanhood of a female 
invert.”270 The court continued its description: 
In broad outline the story shows how these unnatural tendencies 
manifested themselves from early childhood; the queer attraction of 
the child to the maid in the household; her affairs with one Angela 
Crossby, a normally sexed, but unhappily married woman, causing 
further dissension between the latter and her husband, her jealousy 
of another man who later debauched this married woman, and her 
despair, in being supplanted by him in Angela’s affections, are 
 
 
 268. Id. at 170 (citations omitted). 
 269. N.Y. Penal Law § 1140–a (1920) (repealed) read at the time that “any person who as owner, 
manager, producer, director, actor or agent or in any other capacity prepares, advertises, gives, directs, 
presents or participates in, any obscene, indecent, immoral or impure drama, play, exhibition, show or 
entertainment . . . which would tend to the corruption of the morals of youth or others” was guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 
 270. People v. Friede, 233 N.Y.S. 565, 566–67 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1929). The court cited Hicklin 
and Muller. Id. at 568. The court stressed that the recent amendment to § 1140–a forbade any play 
“dealing with the subject of sex degeneracy or sex perversion.” Id. at 569. The prosecution in Friede, 
however, was not of a play but a book. 
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vividly portrayed. The book culminates with an extended 
elaboration upon her intimate relations with a normal young girl, 
who becomes a helpless subject of her perverted influence and 
passion, and pictures the struggle for this girl’s affections between 
this invert and a man from whose normal advances she herself had 
previously recoiled, because of her own perverted nature. Her sex 
experiences are set forth in some detail and also her visits to various 
resorts frequented by male and female inverts. 
 The author has treated these incidents not without some restraint; 
nor is it disputed that the book has literary merit. . . . Yet the 
narrative does not veer from its central theme, and the emotional 
and literary setting in which they are found give the incidents 
described therein great force and poignancy. The unnatural and 
depraved relationships portrayed are sought to be idealized and 
extolled. The characters in the book who indulge in these vices are 
described in attractive terms, and it is maintained throughout that 
they be accepted on the same plane as persons normally constituted, 
and that their perverse and inverted love is as worthy as the 
affection between normal beings and should be considered just as 
sacred by society. 
 The book can have no moral value, since it seeks to justify the 
right of a pervert to prey upon normal members of a community, 
and to uphold such relationship as noble and lofty. Although it 
pleads for tolerance on the part of society of those possessed of and 
inflicted with perverted traits and tendencies, it does not argue for 
repression or moderation of insidious impulses.271  
In the face of this hostility, Morris Ernst, who represented the 
defendants in Friede and who a few years later would represent Random 
House in its effort to publish Ulysses, “began a massive advertising 
campaign on behalf of his clients.”272 Tried before a panel of three judges 
two months later, the defendants were acquitted and within a year, the 
publisher had sold 100,000 copies of the book.273 
New York obscenity law was at a crossroads in 1921 when Anderson 
and Heap were convicted. Down one path, still available to jurists who 
wished to take it, was the harsh dicta of Muller, quoting Hicklin. Down the 
 
 
 271. Id. at 566–67.  
 272. BOYER, supra note 40, at 133.  
 273. Id. at 133–34. 
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other path was the view that the obscenity statute did not reach 
descriptions of sex simply because they were offensive if they did not also 
“excite lustful and lecherous desire.”274 In the following decade, judges 
took the second path far more often than the first until it became the 
predominant one. Certainly, Quinn’s chances of reversal would have been 
greater at the end of the decade than at its start; but if the case had been 
tried differently, if respected opinions about Joyce had been encouraged 
extra-judicially before (and then if necessary following) the trial, if Quinn 
had sought review of the convictions even as high as the Court of 
Appeals,275 the chance of reversal would have been at least fair. Given the 
stakes, it was worth the effort or at least serious consideration. In the case 
of the book Jurgen, Boyer reports that Quinn also thought that “conviction 
was inevitable” and hoped that the case would be “forgotten” following 
transfer to the Court of General Sessions in 1920.276 He persuaded the 
publisher to withdraw the book to reduce the likelihood of a harsh 
sentence if the case was tried. After the transfer, Quinn withdrew from the 
case.277 Quinn was wrong in both predictions.278 The matter was not 
forgotten and a new lawyer won an acquittal in 1922. Quinn evinced the 
same timidity and pessimism in the case against Anderson and Heap. The 
publishing history of Ulysses could have been quite different if Quinn had 
mounted a more aggressive defense or an appeal. 
E. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce: The 
Prelude279 
We now move ahead a decade. It is December 1931. Bennett Cerf is 
the thirty-three-year-old president of Random House, which he started in 
1927 with his friend, Donald Klopfer.280 Older generations remember 
Bennett Cerf as a long time contestant on the television quiz show 
“What’s My Line?,”281 but he had a prior and more interesting life. That 
would no doubt have been true whether or not Cerf had acquired the right 
to publish Ulysses, but winning it contributed to his early success and the 
success of Random House. As Cerf described it in a 1934 essay, written 
 
 
 274. People v. Eastman, 81 N.E. 459, 460 (N.Y. 1907) (Cullen, J., concurring). 
 275. See supra note 231 on the jurisdictional questions. 
 276. BOYER, supra note 40, at 76.  
 277. Id. 
 278. See id. at 78. 
 279. And Bennett Cerf Remembers Events That Didn’t Happen and Forgets One That Did. 
 280. Alden Whitman, Bennett Cerf Dies; Publisher, Writer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1971, at 56. 
 281. Id. 
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shortly after he published Ulysses, he was “summoned” to the brokerage 
firm of Sartorius & Smith in December 1931 by Robert Kastor, a wealthy 
businessman, but more importantly, the brother of Helen Joyce, wife of 
Georgio Joyce, James Joyce’s son.282 Forty-five years later, in his 
autobiography “At Random,” Cerf would airbrush Kastor out of the story. 
By then, Cerf was the hero, the person who got the idea to free Ulysses in 
the United States and who wrote to Joyce, care of Sylvia Beach, to elicit 
his interest.283 Back in 1934, however, Cerf recalled that Kastor had asked 
him if Random House was interested in publishing Ulysses. After 
consulting Klopfer, Cerf said yes.284 By April, Random House had a 
contract giving it the United States rights to the book. Joyce received a 
$1,000 advance and would receive an additional $1,500 on publication and 
royalties on sales of between fifteen and twenty percent.285 About this 
time, too, Cerf made what was the most important non-editorial decision 
on the way to his goal. He called Morris Ernst. Why Ernst? 
Ernst was born in Alabama in 1888,286 eighteen years Quinn’s junior. 
Where Quinn seemed to seek accommodation with the forces of 
suppression, Ernst’s style was opposite. He confronted them directly. 
Ernst’s father had immigrated to the United States from Eastern Europe. 
When Ernst was two, the family moved to New York. Ernst went to 
Williams College and to New York Law School at night, selling shirts and 
furniture by day.287 By 1931, when Kastor summoned Cerf, Ernst was a 
prominent New York lawyer, a partner in Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst, and 
a general counsel of the American Civil Liberties Union.288 He had 
successfully argued several censorship cases in federal and state courts.289 
Ernst was interested in Ulysses even before Cerf called. He had been 
scouting for a client to hire him to bring a case. He must have realized that 
in winning the right to publish Ulysses he could achieve three goals 
simultaneously: support civil liberties, become more famous, and earn a 
 
 
 282. Bennett Cerf, Publishing Ulysses, CONTEMPO: A REV. OF BOOKS AND PERSONALITIES, Feb. 
15, 1934, at 1. 
 283. BENNETT CERF, AT RANDOM 90 (1977). 
 284. Cerf, Publishing Ulysses, supra note 282, at 2. 
 285. The text of the contract is printed in THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ONE BOOK 
ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra note 230, at 105–07. Adjusting for inflation, $2,500 equals 
more than $37,000 in 2006. 
 286. Alden Whitman, Morris Ernst, ‘Ulysses’ Case Lawyer, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1976, at 
40. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. These included People v. Friede, 233 N.Y.S. 565 (N.Y. Magis. Ct. 1929) (“The Well of 
Loneliness”) and United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Sex Side of Life”). 
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lot of money. In August 1931, four months before Kastor’s call, Ernst’s 
associate Alexander Lindey met with Sylvia Beach’s sister about 
American rights to the book.290 That avenue was not productive. In 
October 1931, Ernst wrote to Ben Huebsch, the publisher of Dubliners and 
Portrait of an Artist, “in regard to possible services that we might render 
in connection with the legalization of Joyce’s Ulysses.”291 But Huebsch 
declined.292 Ernst remained determined. Not shy, he must have let it be 
known that he wanted to bring a case that would free Ulysses for 
American publication because word had clearly reached Cerf. In his 1977 
autobiography, Cerf wrote that he “had heard Morris Ernst say one night” 
that he would “like to wage a fight to legalize” Ulysses.293 Soon after 
Kastor called Cerf at the end of 1931, Cerf called Ernst. By March 1932, 
they were planning strategy.  
Random House faced two huge financial obstacles. Because the young 
company had little money, it needed confidence that Ulysses would not be 
prosecuted before committing to pay for publication. And it could not 
afford Ernst’s fees. Ernst solved both problems. His strategy was to have 
one copy of the Shakespeare and Company (English) edition of Ulysses 
sent from France and seized by Customs as obscene.294 Ernst would then 
contest that charge in court.295 If he won, Random House would publish. 
This way, before Random House spent any money publishing the book, it 
could test its legal right to do so in at least one court. That reduced (though 
it did not eliminate) one financial risk. The other problem was how to pay 
the lawyer. Ernst had thought about that, too. His firm agreed to a retainer 
of $500, at least $50 per day in the event of a jury trial, and something 
else.296 The firm would get a royalty of between two and five percent of 
 
 
 290. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra 
note 230, at 77–78. 
 291. Id. at 98–100. 
 292. Id. at 100. 
 293. CERF, AT RANDOM, supra note 283, at 90. Cerf died in August 1971. Between 1967 and 
1971, he participated in interviews at Columbia University’s Oral History program and then edited a 
transcript of the interviews. The manuscript became the basis for the 1977 autobiography, augmented 
from other sources. Cerf and Ernst began their discussions even before Cerf had a signed contract with 
Joyce. Random House sent the contract to Joyce on March 23, and Cerf notified Ernst on April 13, 
1932, that the signed contract “came in from Joyce yesterday.” THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. 
ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra note 230, at 108, 118.  
 294. VANDERHAM, supra note 6, at 88.  
 295. Id. 
 296. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra 
note 230, at 108–12. The correspondence over fees hit one snag. Ernst had insisted on an additional fee 
in the event of a jury trial. His position was that it would “in no event be less than $50.00 per day.” Id. 
at 109. Cerf responded with a definite offer of “per diem compensation for possible time in court . . . 
[at] precisely $50.00 a day.” Id. at 110. Ernst replied that he did not “want to seem unduly insistent” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/1
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any money Random House earned on the sale of Ulysses, the exact 
percentage depending on the edition. Think about it. A royalty on the 
profits from the sale of Ulysses in the United States with no time limit. 
Some sources report that the royalty was to last only for Ernst’s life297 
(Ernst died in 1976) but that is not what the correspondence over the fee 
says.298 Greenbaum, Wolf & Ernst is now defunct.299 I asked Random 
House if any descendants of the firm’s lawyers continued to receive 
royalties from Ulysses, but it declined to say.  
Ernst believed that his chances of winning in court would be improved 
if the addressee for the copy of Ulysses sent from Paris was a prominent 
American. But who? Unlike John Quinn, Ernst and Cerf planned a public 
campaign so the judges who would decide the book’s fate might find 
comfort and protection in an elite opinion. Cerf first asked the recently 
retired Oliver Wendell Holmes to agree to accept delivery of a copy of 
Ulysses. Cerf gushed:  
 If you will permit us to do so, I would like to have this Paris 
copy of Ulysses addressed to you. There is no man in the entire 
country whose name in connection with this case would be more 
helpful in swaying any member of the judiciary. By the same token, 
I feel that there is no man in this country more apt than you to be 
 
 
but nonetheless did insist on his formulation of not less than $50.00 per day. Id. at 111. Ernst predicted 
that the prospect of a jury trial was “remote,” and as it turns out, there was none. Id.  
 297. Cerf so recalls in his autobiography, At Random, published the year following Ernst’s death 
and six years after Cerf died. Cerf wrote that he had lunch with Ernst in March 1932 and asked if Ernst 
would fight the case in court if Random House could “get Joyce signed up to do an American edition 
of Ulysses.” Then he added, “‘We haven’t got the money to pay your fancy prices’—he was a very 
high-powered lawyer—‘but I’d like to make you a proposition. We’ll pay all the court expenses, and if 
you win the case, you’ll get a royalty on Ulysses for the rest of your life.’” CERF, supra note 283, at 
90; see also GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 333 (1994) (“Ernst would 
get a royalty on Ulysses for the rest of his life if it were successfully published in the United States.”). 
It is unlikely that the idea for a royalty originated with Cerf. The prior October, Ernst had offered Ben 
Huebsch a maximum fee of $2,000 plus a four percent royalty. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. 
ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra note 230, at 99. Ernst’s 1976 obituary in the 
New York Times is ambiguous on this question. “The Ulysses cases unwittingly provided Mr. Ernst 
with a substantial life-long income. In the place of a fee, which Mr. Cerf thought too high, Random 
House agreed to pay Mr. Ernst a 5 percent royalty on its hardbound edition and 2 percent on its 
Modern Library Giant and Vintage editions. As a result, he received several hundred thousand 
dollars.” Whitman, supra note 286, at 40. This description does not exclude continued payment to his 
heirs. I question the word “unwittingly.” I think instead that Ernst knew exactly what he was doing and 
saw the upside if Ulysses was successfully published in the United States. 
 298. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra 
note 230, at 108 (referring to a royalty of 2–5 percent on “all copies of the book” depending on the 
edition and without limitation as to time).  
 299. The firm closed in June 1982. RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS at 186 (1991).  
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willing to lend his name to fight to win James Joyce the due that has 
so long been owing to him on Ulysses in the United States.300  
Two days later, Holmes’s secretary said no.301 The next day, Cerf sent 
an equally effusive letter to Nicholas Murray Butler, president of 
Columbia University, Cerf’s alma mater.302 Three days later, Butler’s 
assistant said no.303 Undaunted, the next day Cerf tried a third time, telling 
Roy Howard, of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, that Howard was the 
ideal recipient of the book.304 Five days later, Howard’s assistant said 
no.305 Cerf and Ernst then gave up and authorized Paul Léon, Joyce’s 
secretary in Paris, to send the book to Random House itself.306 Ernst 
instructed Cerf to ask Léon to paste complimentary reviews of Ulysses in 
the book.307 They had to be pasted in the book to make them part of the 
book. Ernst’s idea was that the judge who eventually decided the case 
would then see the reviews, which might not otherwise be allowed in 
evidence.308 On May 1, 1932, Léon cabled Cerf: 
 JAMES JOYCES BOOK ULYSSES FORWARDED YOU AS 
FIRST CLASS REGISTERED MAIL DESIGNATED BREMEN 
SAILED 28 DUE NEW YORK MAY THIRD CONTAINING 
COPIES PASTED IN VOLUME OF DOCUMENTS 
ENUMERATED MY LETTER DESPATCHED SAME BOAT 
CABLE RECEIPT309 
The New York Times of May 4, 1932 reports that the Bremen did 
indeed arrive in New York on May 3, docking in Brooklyn.310 In his 1977 
 
 
 300. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra 
note 230, at 113–14.  
 301. Id. at 115. 
 302. Letter from Bennett Cerf to Nicholas Butler (Apr. 2, 1932) (on file in Random House 
Archive, Columbia University). 
 303. Letter from Nicholas Butler’s Assistant to Bennett Cerf (Apr. 5, 1932) (original in Random 
House Archive, Columbia University). 
 304. Letter from Bennett Cerf to Roy Howard (Apr. 6, 1932) (on file in Random House Archive, 
Columbia University). 
 305. Letter from Roy Howard’s Assistant to Bennett Cerf (Apr. 11, 1932) (original in Random 
Archive, Columbia University). Roy Howard himself initially declined, citing his time commitments. 
Letter from Roy Howard to Bennett Cerf (Apr. 7, 1932) (original in Random House Archive, 
Columbia University). Cerf responded that no time would be required. Letter from Bennett Cerf to 
Roy Howard (Apr. 9, 1932) (original in Random House Archive, Columbia University).  
 306. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra 
note 230, at 119. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. at 133. 
 310. Shipping and Mails, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1932, at 41. 
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autobiography, Cerf recalls what happened next.311 Random House sent an 
agent to the dock to make certain the book was seized. Absent seizure, the 
plan would collapse. It was “one of the hottest days in the history of New 
York,” Cerf wrote.312 “The temperature on the dock must have been 120 
degrees.”313 The Customs people just wanted to go home. “They were 
stamping everything without opening it.”314 The Random House emissary 
protested. “I insist that you open that bag and search it,” he said, according 
to Cerf.315 So the Customs officer opened the bag and, on finding Ulysses, 
said: “Oh, for God’s sake, everybody brings that in. We don’t pay any 
attention to it.”316 But the Random House agent insisted that the book be 
seized and so it was.  
This is a wonderful story. But in a quip often attributed to Mark Twain 
about such stories: “Interesting if true and interesting anyway.”317 Cerf’s 
story is most likely not true. The weather in New York on May 3, 1932, 
the day the Bremen docked, reached a high of sixty-nine degrees 
Fahrenheit, hardly “one of the hottest days in the history of New York,” as 
Cerf claimed.318 The next day the high was seventy-two degrees.319 In the 
following six days, the high temperature ranged from fifty-six to sixty-six 
degrees Fahrenheit.320 Furthermore, the contemporaneous record reveals 
that Ernst had a better plan to prevent the book from slipping through 
Customs. He wrote to the Collector of Customs on May 2, the day before 
the boat arrived, to inform him that Ulysses was on it. The same day, he 
phoned the news to the Customs legal department. And just to be safe, he 
wrote a follow up letter to the legal department on May 6.321 A week later, 
 
 
 311. CERF, AT RANDOM, supra note 283, at 92. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at 93. 
 317. This observation is often attributed to Twain, as a Google search will immediately reveal, 
although I could not find it in his published writings. 
 318. The Weather, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1932, at 41. A day earlier the high was sixty-three degrees. 
The Weather, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1932, at 47. 
 319. The Weather, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1932, at 40. 
 320. The Weather, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1932, at 37; The Weather, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1932, at 
33; The Weather, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1932, at S12; The Weather, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1932, at 33; 
The Weather, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1932, at 42; The Weather, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1932, at 41. 
 321. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra 
note 230, at 132–34 (Letter from Morris Ernst to Collector of Customs (May 2, 1932)). On May 6, 
1932, Ernst wrote again, referencing “our telephone conversation of May 2” and asking whether the 
copy of Ulysses “has been seized by the Collector of Customs; and if so, what action is being 
contemplated thereon. Id. at 135 (Letter from Morris Ernst to Collector of Customs (May 6, 1932)). 
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the Assistant Director of Customs assured Ernst that the book had been 
seized.322  
F. Ulysses Returns to Court 
So Ernst’s strategy succeeded. Customs had the book and Ernst could 
challenge the seizure in court. But this took some time. The United States 
waited seven months, until December 9, 1932, to bring the matter to 
court.323 It took nearly another year for the case to be argued. Despite this 
delay, the government supported Ernst’s strategy in two important ways. 
First, review of court documents reveals that the government repeatedly 
accommodated Ernst’s desire to assign the case to Judge John Munro 
Woolsey,324 who Ernst believed would be more receptive to his arguments 
than any other judge on the federal bench in Manhattan.325 Second, the 
government also agreed to have Woolsey try the case without a jury, 
which Ernst believed would increase his chances of victory.326  
Who was Woolsey?327 Woolsey’s family had come to America before 
the Revolutionary War, settling in the Northeast, although the judge was 
born in 1877 in South Carolina, where his parents had moved in 1870.328 
Woolsey was educated at Andover, Yale, and Columbia Law School.329 
He practiced admiralty law in New York for his entire legal career.330 
President Coolidge nominated Woolsey to the district court in 1928, but 
 
 
 322. Id. at 142. That Cerf’s story is improbable is revealed in another inaccuracy. He writes that 
he and others in New York took a copy of Ulysses and pasted in it the good opinion of literary 
luminaries, then shipped it to France to be sent back to the United States. CERF, AT RANDOM, supra 
note 283, at 92. But the documentary evidence shows that the book originated in Paris. See supra text 
accompanying notes 306–67. 
 323. THE UNITED STATES V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra note 230, at 
165. 
 324. Id. at 172, 176, 202. 
 325. See, e.g., id. at 219, Interoffice Memorandum from Morris Ernst to Jonas Shapiro, dated Aug. 
25, 1933 (“Please follow up the Ulysses case next week. Don’t let it get away from Woolsey”). Ernst’s 
choice of Woolsey is easy to understand. In 1931, Woolsey ruled that the book Married Love, by Dr. 
Marie Stopes, was not obscene and could be imported into the United States. The lawyer for the 
publishing company that sought to import the book was Morris Ernst. Removes Federal Ban on Book 
on Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1931, at 20. 
 326. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra 
note 230, at 179–80. 
 327. The biographical information in this paragraph, unless otherwise cited, is taken from John M. 
Woolsey, Jr., Judge John M. Woolsey, 37.3 JAMES JOYCE Q. 367 (Spring/Summer 2000); and S.J. 
Woolf, A Judge Who Scans the Drama of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1934, at SM7. 
 328. Id.  
 329. Id. 
 330. Woolsey, supra note 327, at 368. 
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the congressional term ended before he was confirmed.331 President 
Hoover re-nominated him and he took his seat in 1929.332 He served until 
1943 and died in 1945 at age sixty-eight.333 
Ernst’s legal memoranda in support of his arguments are particularly 
impressive for the array of opinions and exhibits he collected. The firm’s 
“Preliminary Memorandum” in the district court contained testimonials 
from prominent persons supporting Ulysses, books and articles whose 
subject was Joyce or Ulysses or both, comments from librarians endorsing 
Ulysses and expressing a desire to circulate the book, and critical reviews 
of Ulysses.334 The memorandum declares (surely an overstatement) that 
“no course dealing with twentieth century English letters, given at any of 
our colleges or universities, fails to include Joyce and Ulysses.”335 It 
places Ulysses on “the reading list at Harvard in connection with English 
26, given last year by T.S. Eliot . . . and three years ago by I.A. Richards, 
Professor at Cambridge and Peking.”336 The purpose behind this strategy, 
which John Quinn had eschewed, is apparent and instructive. By providing 
judges (and therefore the public) with the favorable views of those whose 
positions gave them special standing to identify literary value, it became 
respectable and safe for judges to permit publication. Important, too, is 
what Ernst did not argue and what the two Ulysses opinions did not cite: 
the First Amendment. At the time, constitutional free speech and press 
guarantees offered no brake on the government’s ability to suppress 
obscenity. Obscenity was not constitutionally protected. The Constitution 
seemed to place no limit on what could be defined as obscene. Today, 
obscenity is still not constitutionally protected, but in 1957 the Supreme 
Court held that the First Amendment placed limits on how “obscenity” 
may be defined.337  
Judge Woolsey spent his vacation in 1933 reading Ulysses and books 
about Ulysses.338 He held oral argument on November 25, not in the 
federal courthouse but in a courtroom at the Association of the Bar of the 
 
 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Obituary, John M. Woolsey, Retired Jurist, 68, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1945, at 15. 
 334. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra 
note 230, at 229. Ernst’s brief to the court is printed at id. at 378. 
 335. Id. at 262. 
 336. Id. at 263. The firm learned of the Richards course from an unsolicited letter that a Harvard 
student wrote to Random House. The student, Peter A. Pertzoff, then provided the firm, at its request, 
with a copy of his thesis in the class. Id. at 211.  
 337. Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 338. To Pass On ‘Ulysses,’ N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1933, at 16. See also United States v. One Book 
Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). 
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City of New York on West Forty-fourth Street.339 No transcript of the 
argument exists. But if we allow ourselves small literary license, we can 
construct a reliable “transcript” solely from the direct and indirect quotes 
in contemporaneous press reports.340 
 Samuel Coleman (the government’s lawyer): I do not think that 
obscenity necessarily should be limited to exciting sexual feeling. I 
can understand people reading something that does not excite them 
in such a manner but which they might still pass on as being 
obscene. I should say a thing is obscene by the ordinary language 
used and by what it does to the average reader. It need not 
necessarily be what the author intended. On these grounds, I think 
there are ample reasons to consider Ulysses to be an obscene book. 
Although there are good old Anglo-Saxon words in many books 
that have been passed on by courts, obscenity is in the very texture 
of Ulysses and could not be eradicated without destroying essential 
values of the book. No one would dare attack the literary value of 
the book. I liked Ulysses but there is obscenity in it. 
 Morris Ernst: Libraries and the people all over America already 
have accepted Ulysses through bootleg sources as a classic, and the 
court should follow the will of the public. I have made a study of 
what language in books does to the ordinary reader and have yet to 
find one single instance where it could be proved that the reading of 
any book led to the commission of a crime of passion. When I first 
read the book I found it very difficult to understand and recognized 
little value in it. Later, however, I recognized the great significance 
of the novel. The law does not require that adult literature be 
reduced to mush for infants.  
 Judge Woolsey: Suppose that a girl of eighteen or twenty read 
the soliloquy of Marion Bloom. Wouldn’t it be apt to corrupt her?  
 Ernst: That is not the standard we should go by.  
 Woolsey: I studied a copy of Ulysses very carefully, marking all 
words and passages that might be considered obscene, and I am 
distressed and bothered because I seem to understand all these 
allusions; it is a very disturbing book. I am entirely against 
 
 
 339. Court Undecided on ‘Ulysses’ Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1933, at 16. 
 340. ‘Ulysses’ Case Reaches Court After 10 Years, N.Y. HERALD-TRIB., Nov. 26, 1933, at 17; 
Court Undecided, supra note 339. 
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censorship. I am entirely opposed to it. I think things should take 
their chance in the marketplace. Otherwise you have bootlegging, 
everybody sees about as much as though the traffic was openly 
permitted, and the profits all go to persons illegally engaged.  
 Parts of the book are pretty rough, really, but other parts are 
swell. There are passages of moving literary beauty, passages of 
worth and power. I tell you, reading parts of that book almost drove 
me frantic. The last part, that soliloquy, it may represent the moods 
of a woman of that sort. That is what disturbs me. I seem to 
understand it. At the same time there were sections that were so 
obscure, so vague, so unintelligible—I didn’t know what they were 
about. I found those parts dull and boring. The book left me 
bothered, stirred, and troubled.  
 Ernst: I think that is exactly the effect of Ulysses. You have not 
used the adjectives “shocked” or “revolted.” You have used the 
adjectives “bothered,” “troubled.”  
On December 6, 1933, Woolsey ruled that the government could not 
seize Ulysses as obscene.341 Woolsey’s decision has been hailed, by Ernst 
and others, even to the present day. Ernst called it “wise and epoch-
making.”342 Random House used it as the preface to Ulysses for half a 
century.343 Richard Ellmann, Joyce’s biographer, called the opinion 
“eloquently and emphatically” delivered.344 But not everyone agrees. Paul 
Vanderham has criticized the opinion from the point of view of a scholar 
of literature. The “‘well-intentioned lies’” in Woolsey’s opinion, he writes, 
“misrepresented the nature of Ulysses and, implicitly, literature in 
general.”345 Within months of Woolsey’s opinion, critic and author Ben 
Ray Redman, while welcoming the result, was highly critical of its 
definition of obscenity and the effect on literature. “Let me repeat,” he 
wrote,  
 
 
 341. Court Lifts Ban On “Ulysses” Here, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1933, at 21. 
 342. MORRIS L. ERNST, The Censor Marches On, in THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ONE 
BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra note 230, at 19, 24. Paul Vanderham collects other 
compliments of Woolsey’s decision, including from academics, editors, critics, and of course Bennett 
Cerf himself. VANDERHAM, supra note 6, at 129–30. 
 343. VANDERHAM, supra note 6, at 150 (Woolsey’s decision was appended to the British edition 
until 1960 and the American edition until 1986). 
 344. ELLMANN, supra note 7, at 666. 
 345. VANDERHAM, supra note 6, at 116 (quoting Leslie Fiedler). See also BOYER, supra note 40, 
at 252–54 (collecting favorable and unfavorable responses).  
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that the legal definition of obscenity, enunciated by Judge Woolsey 
in the course of duty, bears no relation to the facts of life and the 
realities of literature, and that we cannot even begin to talk of 
satisfactory formulas for censorial judgment until this definition is 
abolished or altered beyond recognition.346  
My criticism is different. The opinion is not recognizable as law. It 
proves why the law should mostly stay out of the censorship business. 
Twenty-five years later, Learned Hand, one of three judges who heard the 
government’s appeal from Woolsey’s decision, told his biographer, Gerald 
Gunther, that Woolsey thought himself “literary” and “That’s a very 
dangerous thing for a judge to be. I didn’t say it was a bad quality; I said it 
was a dangerous one . . . .”347  
Hand was right. Some of the language in Woolsey’s opinion purports 
to be literary while reading more like parody. For example:  
Joyce has attempted—it seems to me, with astonishing success—to 
show how the screen of consciousness with its ever-shifting 
kaleidoscopic impressions carries, as it were on a plastic palimpsest, 
not only what is in the focus of each man’s observation of the actual 
things about him, but also in a penumbral zone residua of past 
impressions, some recent and some drawn up by association from 
the domain of the subconscious.348  
Woolsey’s legal analysis was more straightforward but no more 
impressive. It posed a series of questions that Woolsey seems to have 
invented to give him a license to address the literary value of the book. It 
is at most a small overstatement to say that the decision is useful law for 
only one book. Other publishers and their lawyers would be hard pressed 
to explain how its obstacle course of tests might benefit them.349 Certainly 
the particular hoops through which Woolsey made Joyce jump are the 
product of no discernable precedent. Woolsey could only have found them 
in his imagination.  
Here is how Woolsey reached his decision. He said that the “first” 
question to ask is “whether the intent with which [a] book was written . . . 
was what is called, according to the usual phrase, pornographic, that is, 
 
 
 346. Ben Ray Redman, Obscenity and Censorship, XCV SCRIBNER’S MAG. 341, 343 (1934). 
 347. GUNTHER, supra note 297, at 338. 
 348. United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). 
 349. Redman also argued that Woolsey’s analysis does little more than liberate “a single book.” 
Redman, supra, note 346, at 342. 
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written for the purpose of exploiting obscenity.”350 If the answer is yes, the 
book is banned, apparently regardless of its merit.351 But Ulysses survived 
this test because Woolsey did “not detect anywhere the leer of the 
sensualist.”352 We might ask what evidence enabled Woolsey to conclude 
that Joyce was not leering or how Woolsey defined a sensualist. But let 
that go. Woolsey then proceeded to review the artistic merits of the book. 
He addressed Joyce’s “technique.” The word “technique” appears seven 
times in Woolsey’s opinion.353 He believed that it was his prerogative to 
decide whether Joyce was “honest in developing the technique.”354 If not, 
he wrote, “the result would be psychologically misleading and thus 
unfaithful to his chosen technique. Such an attitude would be artistically 
inexcusable.”355 Perhaps, but that would be a reason for a bad review, not 
legal suppression by a man who had spent his career as an admiralty 
lawyer. But let that go, as well.  
Was Joyce true to his technique in Woolsey’s eyes? Joyce used “dirty” 
words, Woolsey wrote, but they “are old Saxon words known to almost all 
men and, I venture, to many women, and are such words as would be 
naturally and habitually used, I believe, by the types of folk whose life, 
physical and mental, Joyce is seeking to describe.”356 (Is the implication 
that they are not “the types of folk” in Woolsey’s social orbit? But then 
how does he know what words they “naturally and habitually” use?) 
“Accordingly,” Woolsey wrote, “I hold that ‘Ulysses’ is a sincere and 
honest book, and I think that the criticisms of it are entirely disposed of by 
its rationale.”357  
But even that was not legally sufficient. Woolsey then introduced yet a 
third test for Joyce to overcome. It is perhaps the hardest. It was not 
enough that Joyce was not a sensualist, did not leer, and was artistically 
honest. “I must endeavor,” Woolsey wrote, “to apply a more objective 
standard to this book in order to determine its effect in the result, 
irrespective of the intent with which it was written.”358 At last, citing 
authority, Woolsey wrote that “obscene” means “[t]ending to stir the sex 
 
 
 350. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. at 183. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 183–84. 
 354. Id. at 183. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 183–84. 
 357. Id. at 184. 
 358. Id. 
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impulses or to lead to sexually impure and lustful thoughts.”359 Ah, but 
whose impulses and thoughts? Could it be Woolsey’s own impulses and 
thoughts? No, it could not because that would not be “objective.” Rather, 
Woolsey said he must predict the reaction of readers “with average sex 
instincts—what the French would call the l’homme moyen sensuel.”360 
How does Woolsey know about such persons unless Woolsey is one of 
them, a proposition he implicitly excludes? Does he hire Dr. Kinsey? Does 
he conduct a poll? As it happens, Woolsey did conduct a poll, in a manner 
of speaking. Telling neither litigant,361 Woolsey “checked my impressions 
with two friends of mine.”362 They “were called on separately, and neither 
knew that I was consulting the other.”363 Woolsey gave each friend the 
legal definition of “obscene” and asked whether Ulysses was within it. He 
does not say whether he considered each friend l’homme moyen sensuel. 
Neither friend, Woolsey reported, thought that the book tended “to excite 
sexual impulses or lustful thoughts.”364 Left unclear is whether Woolsey’s 
friends were offering their own reactions or those of some hypothetical 
reader. Woolsey then concluded, “It is only with the normal person that 
the law is concerned . . . . Whilst in many places the effect of Ulysses on 
the reader undoubtedly is somewhat emetic, nowhere does it tend to be an 
aphrodisiac.”365 “Emetic” is an interesting word. (So is “whilst.”) My 
dictionary defines “emetic” as “an agent that induces vomiting.”366 In other 
 
 
 359. Id. Woolsey cites seven opinions, all in a row, but never refers to their facts or any detail 
about their holdings. He does not cite, and consequently does not have to address, the seemingly 
inconsistent precedent set down by United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1879). See 
discussion of Bennett in supra text accompanying notes 83–115. Why then the citations? Perhaps it 
was an effort to give an ex cathedra pronouncement the outward semblance of law. 
 360. United States v. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1933). 
 361. Today, this conduct would violate the code of conduct for United States Judges. Canon 3A(4) 
permits a judge to “obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding 
before the judge if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the 
advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.” CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. 
JUDGES CANON 3A(4). It is unclear whether the two men Woolsey consulted were “expert[s] on the 
law applicable” to the proceeding before him. But if they were not, then Woolsey would have been 
conducting a factual investigation and that, today, is categorically forbidden by Canon 3A(4). 
Alternatively, the two men Woolsey consulted might be deemed experts within the meaning of Article 
VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (recognizing experts who have “scientific, 
technical, and other specialized knowledge”). If so, Rule 706 allows court-appointed experts. Any 
party is entitled to depose such an expert and is free to cross-examine a court-appointed expert if he or 
she testifies. 
 362. One Book Called “Ulysses,” 5 F. Supp. at 184. 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. at 184–85. 
 365. Id. at 185. 
 366. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1988). 
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words, Ulysses could be legally imported because it could make people 
throw up.  
Who were Woolsey’s two friends? He didn’t tell us. Paul Vanderham 
has identified them as Henry Seidel Canby, who was editor of the 
Saturday Review of Literature, and Charles E. Merrill, Jr.367 This must 
refer to the Charles Merrill, born in 1885, who founded the Merrill Lynch 
brokerage firm. Woolsey consulted no women readers, presumably 
because they could not qualify as l’homme moyen sensuel.  
On January 25, 1934, Random House published the book with a first 
printing of 10,000 copies, which had been sold in advance.368 A month and 
five more printings later, 35,000 copies were in circulation.369 The price 
was $3.50,370 which today equals about fifty dollars. Random House took a 
chance in relying on Woolsey’s decision. The government planned to 
appeal, and it might win. It almost did. Even if Random House won on 
appeal, the decision of a federal trial and appellate court in New York 
would not bind state courts or federal courts elsewhere. What would local 
prosecutors do? Random House bet that Woolsey’s decision would 
inoculate the book against attack nationwide. This was by no means 
certain, but it turned out to be true. 
A new United States Attorney, Martin Conboy, was in office when 
Woolsey issued his ruling. That was not good for Random House. Conboy 
was listed as an officer of the New York Society for the Suppression of 
Vice in its 1929 Annual Report.371 (John Sumner, who had pursued the 
successful prosecution of Anderson and Heap a dozen years earlier, 
remained the Society’s Secretary and encouraged prosecution of the 
book.)372 Conboy had also been active in something called the “Clean 
Books League,” started by a state judge incensed that a lending library had 
given his sixteen-year-old daughter a copy of Lawrence’s Women in Love 
and further incensed on learning that a court had already declared the book 
not obscene.373 It is unsurprising then that Conboy overruled his assistant’s 
recommendation against an appeal. Hearing the appeal were Learned 
Hand, his cousin Augustus Hand, and Martin Manton, the Chief Judge of 
the Circuit Court, who was later convicted of, and imprisoned for, 
 
 
 367. VANDERHAM, supra note 6, at 125. 
 368. John Chamberlain, Books of the Times, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1934, at 17; Book Notes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1934, at 19. 
 369. Book Notes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1934, at 19. 
 370. Books of the Times, supra note 368, at 17. 
 371. VANDERHAM, supra note 6, at 130. 
 372. See infra text accompanying notes 420–21. 
 373. DE GRAZIA, supra note 29 at 74 (1992). 
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corruption.374 According to Ernst’s account, written twenty-five years 
later, when Conboy got up before the Second Circuit, he began: “This 
book is one day in the life of a Hungarian anti-Christ Jew.”375 Ernst’s 
memory of the beginning of Conboy’s argument is not a direct quote and 
Ernst qualifies it by purporting to recount what Conboy stated “in effect.”  
The New York Herald-Tribune quotes similar language but in a 
different and somewhat less disturbing context. According to the Herald-
Tribune, in seeking to disassociate the novel from The Odyssey by Homer, 
on which it is loosely based, Conboy stressed, not in opening his argument 
but in the course of it, that the book was “a setting forth of what purports 
to take place in one day in the life of a Hungarian Jew in Dublin, together 
with his thoughts and ruminations and those of his wife.”376  
An opinion by Augustus Hand, joined by Learned, affirmed 
Woolsey.377 Gunther writes that the Hands did not want Random House to 
be able to use the appellate opinion to sell the book.378 Consequently, it 
could not be quotable. So Augustus was given the assignment. Augustus 
could be relied on to write an unquotable opinion. Learned, they knew, 
could not.379 Augustus’s opinion proved quotable anyway, though Learned 
would likely have written a more memorable one. This should not surprise 
us. Judges surely recognize when the fates have sent them a case that 
offers the possibility of everlasting fame, the precise nature of the fame 
depending on how they rule and the quality of their written opinion.  
Judge Manton dissented. “Who can doubt the obscenity of this book 
after a reading of the pages referred to, which are too indecent to add as a 
footnote to this opinion?,” he wrote.380  
Augustus Hand’s opinion echoes the test for obscenity that Learned 
briefly advanced in United States v. Kennerley,381 which Augustus did not 
cite. There, while refusing to dismiss an indictment under constraint of 
Bennett and Hicklin, Learned went on to ask whether the test should 
 
 
 374. GUNTHER, supra note 297, at 503–13. 
 375. Morris Ernst, Reflections on the Ulysses Trial and Censorship 5, in THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra note 230, at 44, 46. Although it 
was published in 1965, it was written in 1959. Id. at 53 (Ernst writes that the essay was written in 
1959).  
 376. Conboy Opens U.S. Appeal to Bar Ulysses, N.Y. HERALD-TRIB., May 17, 1934, reprinted in 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. ONE BOOK ENTITLED ULYSSES BY JAMES JOYCE, supra note 230, 
at 445, 446. 
 377. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 378. GUNTHER, supra note 297, at 338–39. 
 379. Id.  
 380. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d at 709 (Manton, J., dissenting). 
 381. United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). 
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instead be whether the alleged obscenity is “honestly relevant to the 
adequate expression of innocent ideas.”382 And he contemplated that the 
time might come, though it had not yet, “when men think innocent all that 
which is honestly germane to a pure subject, however little it may mince 
its words.”383 Now, in a memorandum following oral argument, Learned 
Hand wrote that he continued to favor a test of relevance, but was willing 
to compromise: 
Personally I should be disposed to make relevance the test almost 
always. 
 Here at any rate the offending passages are clearly necessary to 
the epic of the soul as Joyce conceived it, and the parts which might 
be the occasion for lubricity in the reader are to my thinking not 
sufficient to condemn a very notable contribution to literature.384  
Now, in the Ulysses opinion, Hand’s Kennerley dictum became key to 
the holding. The idea of relevance (germaneness) appears three times in 
the majority opinion and is essential to the court’s holding: 
Though the depiction happily is not of the “stream of 
consciousness” of all men and perhaps of only those of a morbid 
type, it seems to be sincere, truthful, relevant to the subject, and 
executed with real art.385  
 That numerous long passages in Ulysses contain matter that is 
obscene under any fair definition of the word cannot be gainsaid; 
yet they are relevant to the purpose of depicting the thoughts of the 
characters and are introduced to give meaning to the whole, rather 
than to promote lust or portray filth for its own sake.386  
 In applying this test, relevancy of the objectionable parts to the 
theme, the established reputation of the work in the estimation of 
approved critics, if the book is modern, and the verdict of the past, 
if it is ancient, are persuasive pieces of evidence; for works of art 
 
 
 382. Id. at 120–21. 
 383. Id. at 121.  
 384. Preconference Memorandum from Learned Hand for United States v. One Book Entitled 
Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (July 6, 1934) (original in Harvard University Law Library 
Archives). 
 385. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 706 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 386. Id. at 706–07. 
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are not likely to sustain a high position with no better warrant for 
their existence than their obscene content.387  
The opinion’s breakthrough test for obscenity anticipated the one the 
Supreme Court would adopt more than two decades later and must be 
recognized as the beginning of the modern age of obscenity law. The 
work, the circuit court said, had to be judged “as a whole.”388 Even if parts 
standing alone are obscene, a court had to evaluate the “dominant 
effect.”389 The test for obscenity does not depend on the author’s motives 
(although the opinion equivocates here by referring to the book’s 
“sincerity”).390 Instead, the work must be “viewed objectively.”391 The test 
does not look to the response of those particularly vulnerable to “lustful 
thoughts.”392 Last, the court said, it is appropriate to consider the views of 
“approved critics.”393 The court recognized that “Ulysses is rated as a book 
of considerable power by persons whose opinions are entitled to 
weight.”394  
These conclusions seriously undermined goals of the anti-vice societies 
and would, once developed and applied, spell their disappearance. We can 
only imagine what the reaction of Anthony Comstock might have been. 
He would have foreseen his life’s work upended. But Comstock was long 
dead. As for his successor, Sumner, we do not have to imagine. Sumner 
ardently urged the United States to seek review in the Supreme Court.395 
Language used and scenes depicted in Molly Bloom’s soliloquy—which 
contains a level of detail about sex and lust (and in the soliloquy of a 
woman no less) that would have surpassed anything popularly accepted 
until then or in fact for years thereafter—would now escape judicial 
condemnation and censorship so long as this candor was embedded in 
material that “taken as a whole” allowed a court or jury to conclude that 
the work does not “promote lust” among ordinary adults. The vice 
societies might protest that nothing could now stop an intent reader with 
lust in his heart from skipping “the work as a whole” and focusing on “the 
 
 
 387. Id. at 708. 
 388. Id. at 707. 
 389. Id. at 708. 
 390. Id. at 706–08. 
 391. Id. at 707. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. at 708. 
 394. Id. at 706. That line vindicates Ernst’s decision to marshal extra-judicial endorsements of 
Joyce and the book. 
 395. See infra text accompanying notes 420–21. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss2/1
p 215 Gillers book pages.doc1/14/2008  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] A TENDENCY TO DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT 291 
 
 
 
 
good parts.” True, but inconsequential under a “net effect”396 test, which 
promised to eliminate a substantial amount of the censor’s business and 
reduce its judicial victories. 
But the circuit court’s opinion also posed problems for artists and 
writers. It was now left to juries and judges to decide whether a work is 
“sincere” (“sincere” or “sincerity” is used four times in the opinion)397 and 
whether “the erotic matter is not introduced to promote lust.”398 The 
opinion does not say that a judge can overturn a jury’s guilty verdict 
through an independent review of the facts, which means that unless a 
work is not obscene as a matter of law, a defendant’s fate will depend on 
the sensibility and liberality of randomly selected jurors.399 Furthermore, a 
test asking whether sexually explicit content is “relevant” to the work as a 
whole might lead courts to evaluate literary quality, as Woolsey did. While 
an author or publisher may now call expert witnesses to say that a work 
has “originality, beauty, and distinction,”400 so too may the prosecution 
call experts to say that it does not. 
The opinion is less than forthright in its treatment of precedent, in 
particular in its conclusion that the Supreme Court’s decision in Rosen v. 
United States,401 still good law, had not adopted a Hicklin-inspired 
definition of obscenity.402 Possibly Rosen had not embraced Hicklin, but 
the contrary view is at least as tenable or more so. Hand read Rosen to 
approve Hicklin only for the proposition that “allegations in the indictment 
as to an obscene publication need only be made with sufficient 
particularity to inform the accused of the nature of the charge against 
him.”403 That reading was more hopeful than candid. In Rosen, the 
allegedly obscene matter consisted of pictures of “females, in different 
attitudes of indecency.”404 The trial judge gave a Hicklin charge to the 
 
 
 396. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d at 707. The court also used the phrase 
“dominant effect” when it wrote that it believed “that the proper test of whether a given book is 
obscene is its dominant effect.” Id. at 708. 
 397. Id. at 706 (two times), 707, 708. 
 398. Id. at 707. The references to sincerity and intent—presumably of the artist—seem 
inconsistent with the court’s insistence that the work be “viewed objectively.” Or the court might be 
attributing human motives to the work itself. The Muller court did the same. See supra text 
accompanying notes 128–31. 
 399. Eventually, the Supreme Court held that in obscenity cases, as in other First Amendment 
cases, appellate courts may conduct an independent review of the facts. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 
413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974). 
 400. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d at 707. 
 401. Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896). 
 402. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d at 708. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. at 43. 
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jury. The Supreme Court, after describing the material alleged to be 
obscene, said the instructions were “quite as liberal as the defendant had 
any right to demand,” which would seem to be an endorsement of the 
Hicklin charge.405  
As for United States v. Bennett,406 which relied on Hicklin and would 
appear to be binding circuit precedent, the Hands concluded that its 
“rigorous doctrines” were “inconsistent with our own decision in United 
States v. Dennett.”407 (This is the editorial “our;” Augustus wrote Dennett.) 
“Inconsistent” is a convenient word for the court to use. Literally true at 
some level, but it implies that Dennett made a greater break with precedent 
than its language can support. Dennett overturned a jury conviction for 
sending through the mails a pamphlet entitled “Sex Side of Life,” which 
the court said was written “with sincerity of feeling” by a mother for her 
two sons and other adolescents.408 (The mailing was an unsuspecting 
response to a government sting operation.)409 The problem with 
Augustus’s reliance on Dennett to reject Bennett is that not a word in 
Dennett disapproved of Bennett, which it cited along with Hicklin and 
Rosen. Put another way, a lawyer reading Dennett could not fairly 
conclude that the Hicklin test, as emphatically preserved in Bennett, had 
ceased to be good circuit law when judging fiction.  
And here was another significant gap in the court’s analysis, only 
casually acknowledged. Hicklin, Bennett, and Dennett all addressed non-
fiction: polemical or advocacy pieces in the first two cases, an introduction 
to sex for adolescents in the last one. Ulysses was fiction. Should fiction 
enjoy the same level of protection that Dennett afforded a sex guide for 
adolescents? The court said yes but did not say why. Meanwhile, the 
dissent identified the leap. “Ulysses is a work of fiction. It may not be 
compared with books involving medical subjects or description of certain 
physical or biological facts. It is written for alleged amusement of the 
reader only.”410 This is an interesting challenge to which there are certainly 
answers. It could, for example, be argued that literature and the arts are as 
important to humankind as candor when telling adolescents about the “sex 
side of life.” The majority did not make that argument, except perhaps by 
identifying great works of literature that might also succumb to censorship 
 
 
 405. Rosen, 161 U.S. at 43. 
 406. United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1879). 
 407. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d at 708. 
 408. United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 569 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 409. DE GRAZIA, supra note 29, at 323 n.* (1992). 
 410. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d at 710. 
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under a less generous test and by giving examples of works that had been 
censored in fact, including by Byron and Shelley, but were now 
recognized as great literature.411 
A final riddle presented by the circuit’s Ulysses opinion is that it 
addressed a book, a novel, whose “erotic passages,” the court said, “are 
submerged in the book as a whole.”412 How might other artists—painters 
or photographers, say—determine whether the court’s decision provided 
freedom for work in their medium? A painting or photograph is not 
“submerged” in anything larger than itself. A nude is a nude. Allegations 
of obscenity against paintings cannot readily be met with the defense that 
the work has to be considered as a whole. The painting is the whole. And 
while an entire play is greater than any of its parts, Ulysses left it unclear 
whether its tests were also meant to apply to live theater, with its greater 
capacity for explicit representation. 
But the uncertainties that might trouble writers and artists did not 
concern Conboy, the United States Attorney, who understood the breadth 
of Hand’s opinion and urged the Justice Department to seek Supreme 
Court review. He argued that the decision overruled Bennett and Hicklin, 
both of which had “consistently been followed by the Federal Courts.”413 
And he argued that  
[t]he departure of the Court from the rules which have heretofore 
been applied, has introduced uncertainty and confusion into the law, 
which renders it extremely difficult for both the customs and postal 
authorities properly to administer their Departments with regard to 
the question of whether or not books are obscene.414  
This was certainly true. It is much easier to enforce the obscenity laws 
if the only task is to prove that even one small part of a book is obscene; it 
is harder to do so if the alleged obscenity embedded in a book requires 
consideration of the “dominant effect” of the work, especially if critical 
evaluation may legitimately bear on the answer and be introduced through 
expert testimony. Conboy may have anticipated that writers, artists, and 
critics would be loathe to provide the government with expert testimony so 
that it might suppress artists and writers. 
 
 
 411. The majority identified Venus and Adonis, Hamlet, Romeo and Juliet, and the Eighth Book of 
The Odyssey as works that would be subject to suppression if a book were not considered as a whole. 
Id. at 707. 
 412. Id. 
 413. Letter from Martin Conboy, United States Att’y, to Homer Stille Cummings, Att’y Gen., at 2 
(Aug. 31, 1934) (on file with the National Archives). 
 414. Id.  
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But Conboy’s hope for high court review went unfulfilled. The general 
counsel of the Treasury Department let it be known to the Solicitor 
General that the Customs Bureau had no interest in Supreme Court 
review.415 Then, remarkably, a Justice Department lawyer, in a 
memorandum to the Solicitor General, concluded that neither Bennett nor 
Hicklin should be read to authorize conviction based on only a part of a 
published work. Consequently, he wrote, Ulysses did not in fact overrule 
Bennett or Hicklin, which in turn made high court review less compelling. 
The memorandum reasoned that “[i]f it were true that obscene passages 
must stand alone and be decided without regard to their setting in the book 
or publication, then the admission of the whole book in the Bennett case 
was error, for nothing was competent under such a theory except the 
alleged obscene passages.”416 This analysis is brazenly wrong. It seriously 
misreads the cases. The Hands themselves believed that their opinion 
overruled Bennett, or at the very least that it confirmed that Dennett had 
done so. Bennett merely recognized that the broader context might put the 
offending part in an innocent light and that the defendant should have the 
chance to so argue. That is the reason the entire work was admitted. 
Contrary to the Department’s memo, the trial judge in Bennett, who was 
affirmed on appeal, told the jury that a work was obscene “if any 
substantial part” of it was obscene.417 Even more restrictive, he told the 
jury to “confine your attention to the marked passages . . . . It is upon 
those passages alone that this case must turn.”418 To no avail, Conway 
argued that substantial parts of Ulysses were obscene and on that question, 
 
 
 415. Memorandum from Alexander Holtzoff to the Solicitor Gen. (Sept. 10, 1934) (on file with 
the National Archives). 
 416. Memorandum from Harry S. Ridgely to the Solicitor Gen. (Sep. 10, 1934) (on file with the 
National Archives). The final page of this memorandum contains the word “APPROVED” and the 
signature of Joseph B. Kennan, Assistant Attorney General. It was the same Mr. Kennan who, in a 
March 6, 1934 memorandum for the Solicitor General, recommended that the government appeal 
Judge Woolsey’s decision to the Second Circuit. That earlier memorandum concluded that the 
language in Ulysses made it obscene and immoral. It cited United States v. Limehouse, 285 U.S. 424, 
426 (1932), for a definition of “obscene,” “lewd,” and “lascivious,” very much like the Hicklin test—
“‘Calculated to corrupt and debauch the mind and morals of those into whose hands it might fall’ and 
induce sexual immorality.” In urging appeal, Kennan wrote that a “book minutely describing 
adulterous acts and referring to unnatural sex desires and thoughts as this book does . . . can be 
described only as ‘obscene’ and ‘immoral’.” Memorandum from Joseph B. Keenan to the Solicitor 
General, at 4 (Mar. 6, 1934) (on file with the National Archives). Woolsey may have admitted the 
entire book, he wrote, because he “looked upon it from an artistic and literary sense, and from his own 
point of view, which would be far from that of a man of ordinary intelligence and of an ordinary 
appreciation of literature and art,” whom Kennan said was “commonly known as the man on the 
street.” Id. at 3. I could find no explanation for Kennan’s about-face.  
 417. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.  
 418. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (emphasis added). 
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of course, the Second Circuit agreed.419 But it was not enough to ban the 
book. 
Sumner, who had been around the block with Ulysses in his successful 
prosecution of Anderson and Heap thirteen years earlier, may have seen 
his victory slipping away, not that their convictions would be overturned 
in law, but that they would be culturally and historically overturned, 
viewed as a legal error, which must have appeared even worse. He also 
worried about the precedent the circuit opinion set. He told the Attorney 
General that if the opinion were to stand, “it is difficult to know what book 
may be successfully prosecuted under the Federal law for obscenity.”420 
This was unduly pessimistic in the immediate term; but over the long term, 
Sumner was more prescient than perhaps he (or others) knew. Today, it is 
unlikely that any book consisting solely of words will be suppressed as 
obscene. When informed of the decision not to seek review, Sumner 
bemoaned “that the good old American fighting spirit is lacking, when the 
Department fails to follow up a hard-won partial victory in a district where 
‘broadmindedness’ seems to be considered a judicial virtue.”421 The partial 
“victory” must mean the Manton dissent, which was the only “victory” 
Sumner was going to get.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Today, at least for text, we really do seem to be at “the end of 
obscenity,” as Charles Rembar titled his 1968 book in an excess of 
optimism.422 The title works as a prediction, but it was inaccurate as a 
contemporary description. The Internet, cable television, and greater 
receptivity to candor in theater, books, and films (not to mention T-shirts) 
have all contributed to the near demise of obscenity as a useful legal 
 
 
 419. United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705, 706–07 (2d Cir. 
1934) (“That numerous long passages in Ulysses contain matter that is obscene under any fair 
definition of the word cannot be gainsaid . . . .”). Conboy also wrote that  
even if the Court is correct in its position that the book is to be judged as a whole, rather than 
by particular passages which it contains, it nevertheless seems clear that the objectionable 
passages in Ulysses are so numerous and so lengthy that they permeate and color the whole 
book to such an extent that they render the entire book obscene. 
Letter from Martin Conboy, United States Att’y to Homer Stille Cummings, to Att’y Gen. (Aug. 31, 
1934) (on file with the National Archives).  
 420. Letter from John Sumner to Karl A. Crowley, Solicitor of the Post Office (Oct. 13, 1934) (on 
file with the National Archives). This letter was intended for the Solicitor General and upon learning 
of his error, Sumner forwarded it to the Attorney General on October 18, 1934. 
 421. Letter from John Sumner to Hon. Joseph B. Keenan, Assistant Att’y Gen. (Oct. 24, 1934) (on 
file with the National Archives). 
 422. CHARLES REMBAR, THE END OF OBSCENITY (Random House, 1968). 
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category, though still very much a cultural one. (I put aside as 
conceptually distinct the protection of children and unwilling adults.)423 
Augustus Hand’s opinion freeing Ulysses for publication (or perhaps one 
should say “continued publication” because it had already been published 
before the appeal was decided) set down guideposts that later courts used 
to define the level of constitutional protection that sexually explicit 
material would thereafter enjoy: the work must be judged as a whole; the 
effect must be assessed against community standards and not the 
susceptibility of the most vulnerable; the work’s merit or value must be 
weighed in deciding the question; and expert opinion is relevant to the 
answer.424 The Supreme Court has fiddled with these ingredients, now 
more permissive, now a bit less, but the ingredients remain essentially the 
same.425 And the variations in emphasis matter little if at all today. They 
will interest constitutional scholars and historians, less so writers and 
artists. Of course, the First Amendment still does not constitutionally 
protect obscenity as such. Probably, it never will.426 But legal efforts to 
suppress whatever may fall outside its protection will almost always be 
fruitless, certainly so if the alleged obscenity are words in print. The end 
of the story is good for artists and writers, whose choice of subject need no 
longer pose a threat to their freedom, but it took far too long to get there. 
American courts should have limited Hicklin’s broad language 
immediately. Yet not only did they embrace Hicklin unthinkingly, some, 
including the Second Circuit in Bennett, expanded its reach to punish ideas 
deemed immoral.427 Further, unlike Hicklin, where the only consequence 
to the loser was loss of the pamphlets he wished to distribute, and 
therefore his best argument in the public debate he hoped to encourage, 
Bennett sent a man to prison.428  
We end with a sentiment from our beginning. A bad decision (Hicklin) 
spawned a worse one (Bennett) until bold judges weakened it with a new 
precedent (Ulysses). Meanwhile, we can never know what books were not 
written, plays not performed, pictures not painted, because Hicklin was out 
there intimidating artists and publishers from taking a chance on them. 
 
 
 423. See supra text accompanying notes 34–36. 
 424. See supra text accompanying notes 388–94. 
 425. See cases cited at note 221 supra. 
 426. State constitutions may protect obscenity. State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9 (Or. 1987) 
(dissemination of obscenity is protected under the free speech provisions of the Oregon Constitution). 
 427. See supra text accompanying notes 114–15.  
 428. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
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